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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW IN VIRGINIA, 1870-1970
Patrick M. McSweeney*
V\IRGINIA has never faced more pressing local problems. Both
the population and the economy have grown so rapidly in the
last several decades that the traditional system of local government has
been strained and perhaps even rendered obsolete. This system was
established when Virginia was a predominantly rural and agricultural
state. But after approximately three centuries without radical change,
it has suddenly been threatened by urbanization. Simply put, it was
not designed to operate in a predominantly urban and industrial setting
and has proven unequal to the task of coping with the problems which
attend urbanization.
The principal symptom of Virginia's rapid urbanization is her metro-
politan problem. The traditional local units within metropolitan areas
cannot provide the full range of necessary services or perform certain
governmental functions adequately because of "limited jurisdiction,
limited finances, and insufficient intergovernmental cooperation." ' Al-
though the fragmentation of governmental units within metropolitan
areas is not as pronounced in Virginia as it is in other states,2 it has
nonetheless created a serious problem.3 Fragmentation produces financial
inequities, causes wasteful duplication of administrative functions, and
makes the solution of areawide problems all the more difficult.4
All other problems of local government, however, including the
political and social ones, pale in comparison with the financial prob-
lem. It is simply because this problem is compounded in metropolitan
areas that the metropolitan problem is the state's most serious local
*Member of the Virginia Bar. B.A., Virginia, 1964; LL.B., Richmond, 1968.
1 VA. METROPOLrrAN AREAS STUDY COMM'zN, REPORT 6 (1967) (also popularly known
as the "Hahn Commission Report" or "Hahn Report" after the chairman, Dr. T.
Marshall Hahn, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as the HAHN REPORT].
2See VA. ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE CoUNciL [hereinafter referred to as VALCI, GoVERN-
MENTAL StmDIVISIONS IN VIRGINIA 6 (1955); Deming, An Approach to the Solution of
Metropolitan Government Problems, 35 VA. MUN. Rkv. 292, 293 (1958).
3 See VALC, ANNEXATION AND CONSOLIDATION 11-12 (1964); Drinard, The Metro-
politan Problem in Virginia, 36 VA. Mtm. REV. 93, 94-5 (1959), reprinted in A. RAGAN
& McC. GiLIAM, READINGS IN VIRGINIA GOVERNMENT 184 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as READINGS IN VA. GOV'T].4 See Grant, Trends in Urban Government and Administration, 30 LAW & CONTEMxsP.
PRoB. 38, 46 (1965).
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concern. The need for cooperation, the friction between local units
within the metropolis, and a host of other troublesome matters are
directly related to finances. Solution of the financial problem would
eliminate many of Virginia's other local problems. The incidence of
annexation and consolidation would almost certainly decline if the
need for an increased tax base were otherwise satisfied. Friction be-
tween local units would in large measure be soothed by removing
the financial irritant.
There are many causes of the financial crisis, some of which have
not been isolated; but two major causes have been the reliance upon
inefficient units to supply services which should be provided by larger
entities5 and a noncoincidence of the benefits and the costs of gov-
ernmental services. 6 The latter is not an important factor in rural areas.7
In metropolitan areas, however, these two factors merge. Actually,
they are aspects of the same problem. The multiplicity of units in metro-
politan areas leaves the provision of areawide services (if they are
to be supplied at all) to several entities instead of one. This causes
duplication of effort, unequal services in different sections of a metro-
politan area, or financial inequity with the core city usually bearing
a disproportionately large share of the burden." Mobility and the very
nature of some services (i.e., those whose benefits are impossible to con-
tain within the boundaries of the unit) permit residents of the me-
tropolis to enjoy services which are supplied by a local unit other
than their own. This phenomenon has been called "spillover" and
will be examined more closely later in this article. It is enough for the
moment to mention that "spillover" is a chief source of irritation in
Virginia's metropolitan areas, as can be seen from the recent struggle
in the Richmond area over the occupation tax imposed by the city.10
5 See COMM. FOR EcoNox¢nc DEvELoPmENT [hereinafter referred to as CED], MODERN-
rzING LocAL GoVERNmENT 11 (1966); VALC, GovFRNMEN-AL SUBDIVISIONS IN VIRGINIA 9
(1955); Bane, Local Govermnent: The Next Half Century, 42 U. VA. NEvs LETrER 25,
26 (1966).
6 See ADVISORY COM 'AN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS [hereinafter referred to
as ACIR], PERFORMANCE OF URBAN FUNCTIONS: LOCAL AND AREAWIDE (1963); ACIR,
GoVERNMENTAL STRucruRE, ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 15-16
(1961); Hirsch, Local versus Areawide Urban Governmzent Services, 17 NAT'L TAx J.
331 (1964).
7 Cf. VA. RmAL AFFAIRS STUDY Covrm'N, REPORT 25-31 (1969).
8 Grant, supra note 4, at 46.
9ACIR, GOVERNmmNTAL STRucrTuRE, ORGAmNZATION ANm PLANNING 15 (1961); Fitch,
Metropolitan Financial Problems, 314 ANNALs OF CoNG. 66 (1957).
10 In an attempt to make non-residents who work in the city share part of the
cost of city services, the city imposed a tax on all who are regularly employed there
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Any thought that Virginia is witnessing the end of its rapid growth
stage cannot seriously be entertained. While there were six Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas in Virginia according to the 1967 Census
of Governments," there will be eleven by 1980.12 The projected
population increase will almost certainly be confined to urban areas.13
This suggests that the metropolitan problems will become even more
serious and immeasurably more difficult to solve. Even now, they
cannot be solved piecemeal. Yet Virginians seem unprepared for broad
reform or state and regional planning.14 The longer the postponement
of reform, the more radical the solutions will have to be and the more
bitter the political struggle to effect such solutions will be.
Unfortunately, Virginia's proud history of stable and uncomplicated
local government has led to complacency. The recent, drastic measures
adopted elsewhere to handle local problems have heretofore been of
only academic concern to Virginians. It is true that Virginia has been
remarkably flexible, imaginative, and progressive in meeting local prob-
lems in this century,15 but Virginia has never before confronted the
unsettling change it is now experiencing. The reforms of the first part
of this century, which established Virginia as one of the most in-
novative of the states, were not easily accomplished. Nevertheless, they
cured ills that, while serious, were not critical. The problems of the
1970's and beyond, on the other hand, threaten to paralyze Virginia's
cities and counties. 16
whether resident or non-resident. The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld it, City of
Richmond v. Fary, 210 Va. 338, 171 S.E.2d 257 (1969), but legislation enacted in the
early days of the 1970 Session of the General Assembly put an end to the tax before
it was ever collected by the city.
3 1 U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERcE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1967 CENSUS OF GovERNMENTs
(1968).
12See Dixon, Government in Virginia's Emerging Metropolitan Areas: A Profile,
44 U. VA. NEws LErR 25 (1968). See also Knapp, Population Projection to 1980 for
Virginia Metropolitan Areas, 43 U. VA. NEws LETTER 13 (1967).
13 Cf. Everett & Leach, Urban Problems and Prospects-A Foreword, 30 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PRoB. 1 (1965).
14Witness the fate of the proposals made by the Commission on Constitutional
Revision relating to local government at the hands of the 1969 Extra Session of the
General Assembly.
15 Virginia, for example, was the first state to experiment with the city manager
plan, the first to adopt a county manager plan by popular vote, and a leader in city-
county mergers.
16 Cf. Godwin, Virginia and Her Localities: A Necessary Partnership, 43 U. VA.
NEws LETTER 9, 11 (1966); Temple, The Challenge of an Urban Society: The State
and Local Response, 44 U. VA. NEws LETTER 5 (1967).
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
THE BASIC PATTERN OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINIA
The pattern of local government in Virginia has one feature that
distinguishes it from all other states-separation of city and county.
The Commonwealth is divided into 134 geographical districts, 96 of
which are counties and 38 of which are cities.' 7 No other state with
a county system has given its cities territorial exclusivity and integrity,
but instead superimpose the city on the county system.' State-directed
functions continue to be the responsibility of county government in
those states while the city performs the purely local functions.:" In
Virginia, however, cities are completely independent of counties.20 The
Virginia city, therefore, has all the powers and responsibilities which
the county normally exercises, as well as those additional powers which
are conferred upon it as a municipal corporation through its charter.21
Jurisdiction to tax and to perform other governmental functions with-
in their respective territorial boundaries do not overlap.'
Since the principal role of counties is to act as the arm of the state
in such areas as the administration of justice and the assessment and
collection of state taxes, they are established on a rather arbitrary basis.
23
Cities, on the other hand, are established "by the consent of the per-
sons composing them for the formation of their own local private
advantage and convenience." 24 Both county and city in Virginia serve
a dual role as agents of the state and as local lawmaking bodies with
the power to provide, within the limits of the grant of authority from
the state, for the particular needs of the individual city or county.
25
17 See SECRETARY OF THE CoasimroNWALTH OF VA., REPORT (1968-69); Malielsld, The
Special District Problem in Virginia, 55 VA. L. REv. 1182, 1183 (1969).
18 C. BAni, "A BoDY INcoRPoRATE"-THE EvoiunoN OF CrrY-CouNTY SEPARAION IN
VIRGINIA ix, 35 (1967) [hereinafter cited as A BODY INCORPORATE]; HAHN REPORT, supra
note 1, at 15 (1967).
19 See CED, MODERNIziNG LOCAL GOVa.mxEaNrr 29 (1966).
20F. K. GIBSON & E. S. OVERMAN, CouNrY GovERNvmNT IN VIRGINIA 2 (1961). An
exception, perhaps, is the situation in which a city of the second class shares with a
neighboring county a circuit court and certain constitutional officers. VA. CoDE ANN.
§§ 15.1-994, 15.1-997 (1964).
21 13 M.J. Municipalities § 2, at 363 (1951).
22 A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 18, at 77-83.
235 M.J. Counties § 3, at 90 (1949).
241d. at 90 n. 7; see J. DILLON, MumcrPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 18, 25 (5th ed. 1911)
[hereinafter cited as DUILONI.
25 See DILLON, supra note 24, § 31, at 58-59; G. JENNINGs, VIRGINIA'S GOVERNMENT
111 (1968); K. Millikan, History of Articles VII and VIII, 21 (Memorandum to Va.
Comm'n on Constitutional Revision, July 12, 1968).
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Neither is sovereign. Neither possesses any power not conferred upon
it by the state.26
City and county are fundamentally different in theory,27 but in re-
cent years the two have become almost indistinguishable in fact,
especially in metropolitan areas. Cities are public corporations called
into being by their inhabitants to provide the broad range of public
services associated with urban life.2 8 Because of city-county separation
in Virginia, all the functions which would otherwise have been the
responsibility of county government are subsumed in the city govern-
ment. Thus, in Virginia, the city can be thought of as the fusion of
municipal corporation and county government. As described above,
it exercises all the powers granted to counties plus those additional
corporate and governmental powers conferred by its charter.
Again in theory, counties only incidentally possess corporate
powers.2 9 But as the mode of life in counties grows to resemble that
found in cities, more and more of these corporate powers are vested
in county government to meet the demand of county residents for
services related to health, fire protection, sanitation, industrial develop-
ment, and a host of other needs.30
An interesting feature, but one that is of very little practical im-
portance, is the division of cities into those of the first class and those
of the second.3 The former must have a population of over 10,000;
the latter in excess of 5,000.32 Cities of the second class share certain
constitutional officers with their surrounding counties.33 In addition,
they remain "within the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the county
of which it was originally a part." 34
Town government is the third primary unit of local government in
Virginia. It is not territorially exclusive of the county in which it lies.35
The county continues to exercise all of its powers within the town.
26 Camp v. Birchett, 143 Va. 686, 126 S.E. 665, 129 S.E. 324 (1925); see HAHN
REPORT, supra note 1, at 6 (1967).
27 13 M.J. Municipalities § 2, at 363 (1951).
28 Jones v. Williamsburg, 97 Va. 722, 34 S.E. 883 (1900).
29 See DILLON, supra note 24, § 35, at 64.
30 Cf. REPoar OF THE VA. COMM'N ON CONsTrrTIONAl. REVISION 215 (1968) [herein-
after cited as CCR REPORT].
31 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-978 to -1010 (1964).
32 VA. CODE ANN. §115.1-978, 15.1-1011 (1964).
3 3 VA. CODEANN.§ 15.1-994 (1964).
34 VA. CoDE ANN. I 15.1-997 (1964).
3 5 VA. METROPOLITAN AREAs STUDy COMM'N, GOVERNING THE VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN
AREAS: AN ASSESSMENT 18-19 (1967).
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Town incorporation is ordinarily accomplished in a judicial pro-
ceeding, but it can also occur by means of a special act of the Gen-
eral Assembly. 6 In the judicial proceeding, the court must find that
the population of the area for which incorporation is sought is at least
1,000, that there is a density of 125 persons per square mile, that
incorporation is in the best interest of the inhabitants, and that the
services needed in this community cannot be provided by the estab-
lishment of a sanitary district or by some other arrangement with
the county.
Towns are an important factor in the Virginia scheme of local gov-
ernment only in a negative sense. Since they may be created with
such a low population, they are far too numerous in Virginia.38 These
municipalities are often too small to justify separate governmental
status or to provide efficiently the services demanded of them.39 The
town also causes a drain of revenue away from the county at large,
putting even greater pressure on the county government where it
can least afford it.4 0
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Under our federal system, the central government theoretically ex-
ercises only those powers granted to it by the fifty sovereign states
which retain all other powers not so delegated. Unless they are limited
by the federal Constitution, the states possess exclusive power over
persons and property within their respective jurisdictions.4
The point need not be belabored here that the trend toward cen-
tralization has given this theory of federal-state relations a hollow
ring.42 What is significant is that in spite of this trend, states are
36 See A BODY INcORPORATE, supra note 18, at 71.
37 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-967 (1964).
38VALC, ANN.TiON AND CONSOLIDATION 12-13 (1964); VALC, GoV.NMENTAL
SUBDIVISIONS IN VIRGINIA 12-13 (1955); CCR, REPORT 215 (1968); HAHN REPORT, supra
note 1, at 12 (1967).
39 See CCR REPORT 215.
4 0 See VALC, GOVERNmENTAL SUBDIVISIONS IN VIRGINIA 37-38 (1955); Tucker, County
Gavermnent: A Problem in Administrative Organization, in BuR. oF PuB. ADMiN.,
CouNTY GovERNmENT IN VIRGINIA-A SYmPOSIUM 3 (1942).
4 1 See C. ADRIAN, STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENTS 77 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as ADRIAN]; CED, MoDERNIzING STATE GOVERNMENT 10-11 (1967); L. GuLIcK, Tim
METROPOLITAN PROBLEm AN AMEICAN IDEAS 28 et seq. (1962); R. MARTIN, TMs
CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTM 21 et seq. (1965); 17 MJ. State § 2, at 199 (1951).4 2 See ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 82-86; Darden, Random Thoughts on Government,
20 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 207, 211 (1963); Fordham, The States in the Federal System-
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still looked to for fundamental governmental services such as roads,
education, police protection, public utilities, health services, public wel-
fare, fire protection, and recreation. 3 To furnish these services, states
have created a variety of local governmental units, political subdivi-
sions and administrative agencies.4 4 The traditional local units are the
city, the county, and the town. The states may also provide services
to its citizens through state-level agencies, such as the State Depart-
ment of Highways and the State Police. Falling somewhere between
the traditional units of local government and the state-level adminis-
trative agencies are a variety of creatures of the state: for example, pub-
lic corporations, special districts, and regional authorities.
A basic familiarity with the interaction of governmental units in
the United States is essential to any understanding of modem local
government problems. Such interaction is both "vertical" and "hori-
zontal." 5 Vertical interaction occurs (1) between localities and their
respective states, (2) between localities and the federal government,
and (3) between states and the federal government. In recent years
it has greatly increased as local governments turn to state and federal
sources for funds which they themselves cannot raise by taxation,
borrowing or otherwise. There has also been a nationwide movement
toward "home rule" or broader powers for local units, but the major
concern of localities in their relations with state and federal govern-
ments is obviously the procurement of financial assistance.
The recent interest in federal block grants to the various states and
in direct federal grants to cities has dramatized the importance of
vertical interaction in the future of American local government. 46 No
longer can localities or even states raise sufficient revenues to finance
governmental operations and services without federal assistance. 47 Bor-
rowing by local governments has become more and more costly, and
tax revenues more difficult to find. The federal government, on the
Vital Role or Limbo?, 49 VA. L. REv. 666, 667 (1963); Walker, Myth and Reality in
State Constitutional Development, in W. BROOKE GRAVES (ed.), MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 3, 13 (1967).
43 See CED, supra note 41, at 12; Fordham, supra note 42, at 668.
44See 1 U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1967 CENSUS oF GoVERN-
MENTS 13 (1968).
45See Grant, Trends in Urban Government and Administration, 30 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 38, 50 (1965). See also Fordham, supra note 42, at 669.
40 See Cooper, Updating Local Government in Virginia: The Postwar Period and
Beyond, 43 U. VA. NEWS LETTER 13, 15 (1966); Heller, Should the Government Share
Its Tax Take?, SAT. REv., Mar. 22, 1969, at 26.
47See 1 ACIR, FIscAL BALANCE rC THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 5 (1967).
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other hand, has proven to be an efficient vehicle for raising the neces-
sary funds. The use of block grants to states with few if any strings,
it is argued, would take advantage of this federal tax collection feature
while avoiding the lack of flexibility and responsiveness to local needs
which is so often identified with federally-administered programs.
Horizontal interaction between and among localities has been char-
acterized by acute problems, particularly where metropolitan areas are
concerned. In such areas there are usually several local units with a
core city that has a rapidly deteriorating tax base and an alarming
increase in the demand for services caused by a growing population
of poor people and school age children, and by non-residents working
in the city but residing and paying taxes in an adjoining county.48
The existence of these benefit spillovers, alluded to earlier, has cre-
ated much friction. In an effort to correct the inequities and to estab-
lish a more realistic financial base for providing these services, cities
have resorted to annexation and consolidation. Underlying this trend
toward boundary expansion is the notion that services which benefit
an entire metropolitan area should be financed by the entire metro-
politan area.49 Yet the financial burden on core cities could also be
relieved by federal or state subsidies without the need for annexation
or mergerYn0 In this way, non-residents would pay, at least in part,
for the benefits they receive, through state or federal taxation. How-
ever, if control and administration were left with the city, the residents
of the adjoining units would have little or no voice in the planning
and operation of the departments which provide these areawide ser-
vices.' 1 Inequities could, and probably would, result.
A BRIEF REVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT HSTORY BEFORE 1870
Present-day Virginia government can be traced to the military gov-
ernment provided by the Virginia Company of London, a joint-stock
company chartered in 1606 by James 1.52 When members of the Com-
's See Hirsch, Local Versus Areawide Urban Government Services, 17 NAT'L TAX J.
331, 334 (1964).
49 Cf. ACIR, GOVERmiENTAL STRucrURE, ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING Nlm METRO-
PourAN AazAs 15 (1961); Woo Sik Kee, City-Suburban Differentials in Local Govern-
ment Fiscal Effort, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 183 (1968). "The size of the spilover area indicates
the proper unit for fiscal interrelation." Hirsch, supra note 48, at 336.
50See Hirsch, supra note 48, at 332.
51 See id. at 333.
52 See Rutman, The Virginia Company and Its Military Regime, Tim OLD Do-
MINION 1 (D. Rutman ed. 1964); Tilden, Forerunners of the Public Authority, 7 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1, 18 (1966). See generally S. BEruss, Tim TI-zz CHARTRS oF =iE
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pany in 1607 established the first permanent settlement of Englishmen
in the New World at Jamestown, they were operating within the
framework of an entity that bore a striking resemblance to modern
municipal and public corporations. It has been suggested that the
"basic form of public government in America derived from a so-called
commercial- or rather, proprietary-corporation: the Virginia Corpo-
ration, which was chartered in 1606." .3
In bestowing all the land in Virginia to the Company, the King
created a monopoly and granted powers that were limited only by a
guarantee of individual liberties to the settlers.5 4 The Company's first
charter vested policymaking authority in the King's Council of Vir-
ginia, which sat in London; but the immediate control and adminis-
tration of the colony was the responsibility of the President and Coun-
cil in Virginia.55 Under the first charter, the colony was hampered by
weakness of administration and the lack of central leadership." The
charter was amended, therefore, in 1609 principally to correct these
deficiencies. A Governor was sent to Virginia with greater executive
authority, and the King's Council of Virginia was abolished.5 7
These changes, however, did not provide the answer to all of Vir-
ginia's problems. Starvation and Indian attacks, for example, con-
VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON (1957); W. CRAVEN, TE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON
(1957); S. KINGSBURY, RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY (4 Vol. 1906-33); A. WODE-
NoTII, A SHORT COLLECTION OF THE MOST REMARKABLE PASSAGES FROM THE ORIGIN-
TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY (1651).
Modern public, including municipal, corporations owe much to the Virginia Com-
pany. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC AUTnOITuS IN THE STATES 21
(1953); Lathan, The Body Politic of the Corporation, THE CORPORATION IN MODER2N
SOCIETY ch. 11 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
53 Gerwig, Public Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 591,
595 (1961).
54 Provision to that effect can be found in the original charter of the Company.
S. BEMISS, THE THREE CHARTERS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON 9 (1957).
Alsoe wee doe, for us, our heires and successors, declare by theise presentes
that all and everie the parsons being our subjects which shall dwell and inhabit
within everie or anie of the saide severall Colonies and plantacions and everie
of their children which shall happen to be borne within the limits and pre-
cincts of the said severall Colonies and plantacions shall have and enjoy all
liberties, franchises, and immunities within anie of our other dominions to all
intents and purposes as if they had been abiding and borne within this our
realme of Englande or anie other of our saide dominions.
See also 2 P. BRUCE, INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
231 (1910).
55 See S. BEMIss, supra note 54, at 3. The original charter may also be found in I
W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 57-75 (2d ed. 1823).
56 See T. WERTENBAKER, VIRGINIA UNDER THE STUARTS 2-4 (1914).
57 1 W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 110-13 (2d ed. 1823).
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tributed to a bleak picture of the colony in England, thereby dis-
couraging new investment.58 Without this lifeblood, the Company
was forced to give away parcels of land in Virginia to satisfy the claims
of members who had served the Company in the New World and to
attract new settlers to Virginia. 9 This division of land marked the
beginning of large plantations in Virginia, a movement which was
stimulated by the arrival in Virginia of the first slaves in 1619.60
The Virginia Company was dissolved in 1624, and Virginia became
a royal colony.01 Five years before, however, the first measure of
local self-government had been introduced to Virginia by the creation
of the General Assembly with its two houses: the Council and the
House of Burgesses."'
The manner in which Virginia was settled was largely responsible
for the system of local government which has prevailed in the Com-
monwealth for over three centuries. Unlike New Englanders, who con-
centrated in towns, Virginians established scattered plantations that
were, in the main, self-supporting. 63 The township system of govern-
ment, still found in the New England states, 4 reflected the overriding
interest of the settlers of that region in mutual protection and as-
sistance. 5 Lacking towns and devoid of any mercantile class, Virginia
was unsuited to the township arrangement.66
OS John Smith's (enerall Historie of Virginia, 4th Book, NARRAVEs OF EARLY
VmGnI, 1606-1625, 295 (L. Tyler ed. 1959). See also W. CRav N, THE DISSoLUTiON
OF THE VIRGrNIA Coa PANY: Tim FAiLURE OF A COLONIAL EXPEiEqmNT 195-220 (1932);
C. HATCH, THE Fnsmr S vNTEEN YEARS: VmGINA,, 1607-1624, 28 (1957); G. WLs-oN,
BEHOLD VmGiNA: Tim Frm CRowN 105-17 (1951).0 See I P. BRUCE, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF VrRonA IN = SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 506,
512 (1895); C. HATCH, supra note 58, at 21-23.
100 See W. CRAv N, supra note 58, at 131; C. HATCH, supra note 58, at 25. Wertenbaker,
however, concludes that slaves were not a significant socio-economic factor until
sometime after 1680. T. WmTNBAER, THE PLANTERS OF COLONAL VIRGINA 30-31
(1922).
01 See 1 J. CHLANDLER, Tim Soum m Tm BUILDING OF THE NATION 22 (1909); C.
HATCH, supra note 58, at 29. See generally E. NmL, HISTORY OF THE VIRGNIA CoM-
PANY oF LONDON 385-419 (1869).
021 W. HENiNG, Ti STATUTrS AT LARGE 110 (2d ed. 1823); see Henry, The First
Legislative Assembly in America, 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOG. 55 (1895).
63 See J. GoTrMAN, VIRGINIA AT MID-CENTURY 65-67 (1955). See also 2 P. BRUcE,
supra note 59, at 522-25; T. WERTENBAxER, supra note 60, at 29.
04 See CED, MODERNMZNG LOCAL G omiERm T 30 (1966).
0 5 See E. CHANING, TowN AND CoNmTr GOVERNamNT IN THE ENGLISH COLONIEs OF
NORTH AMERICA 6 (1884); E. INGTE, LOCAL INSTITUTONS OF VIRGINIA 75 (1885);
H. McBAw, GoVERNmF.NT AND POLITICS IN VRmNA 111-12 (1916).
0 See E. INGLu, supra note 65, at 104.
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With the creation in 1634 of eight "shires" in Virginia,67 patterned
after the old English county, a local government structure appeared
that has prevailed without radical change ever since. Although James-
town and other towns existed during the first century of the colony,
they were not the predominant unit of local government in Virginia.6
Recognizing the need for diversifying Virginia's economy which
had become overly-dependent upon tobacco, the General Assembly
between 1655 and 1706 enacted general legislation for the establish-
ment of towns in each county."9 "All ships and vessels were required
to leave their cargo at these designated places, and the planters were
compelled to carry their tobacco and produce to the same place." 70
After fifty years of encouraging the development of towns by general
legislation, the General Assembly had realized little or no success.
Thus, the plan was abandoned in favor of creation of towns by spe-
cial acts.7 1
Meanwhile the number of counties was increasing as settlers moved
westward. By 1680, there were twenty counties in existence; 72 by
1750, there were fifty;73 and in 1800, ninety-nine.74 The number rose be-
tween 1800 and 1863, the year West Virginia became a separate state. "
As of 1870, there were ninety-nine counties in Virginia.
76
In 1780, Jefferson attempted to establish a modified form of town-
67 See A. PORTER, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINIA: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1607-
1904, 11 (1947) [hereinafter cited as PORTER]; M. HIDEN, How JuSTIcE GRE-W; Vnt-
GINIA'S COUNTIES, AN ABSTRACT OF THEIR FORMATION 3-7 (1957); Pinchbeck, Origins and
Evolution of County Govermnent in Virginia, 1 U. RICH. INST. FOR Bus. & CoM-
MUNITY DEV. NEwsLETTER 3 (1968) (originally published in 1948 by the National
Association of County Officials).
68See A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 18, at 4-11. See also E. INGLE, supra note 65,
at 101-09; T. WERTENBAKER, supra note 60, at 29.
691 W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 412-14 (2d ed. 1823); 2 W. HENING, THE
STATUTES AT LARGE 471-78 (2d ed. 1823) (suspended by the King-in-Council because it
was "impracticable"); 3 W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 404-19 (2d ed. 1823);
see A BODY INCORPORATE 5-7.
'0 A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 18, at 5.
71 See id. at 8; E. INGLE, supra note 65, at 76. See generally Riley, The Towun Acts
of Colonial Virginia, 16 J. So. HIsT. 306 (1950).
72 See PORTER, supra note 67, at 12. See generally M. HIDEN, How JUSTICE GREW:
VIRGINIA COUNTIES, AN ABSTRACT OF THEIR FORMATION (1957); J. WEEKS, DATES OF
ORIGIN OF VIRGINIA COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES (1967).
73 See A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 18, at 5.
74 See Pinchbeck, supra note 67, at 3.
75 See Robinson, Virginia Counties: Those Resulting from Virginia Legislation,
9 BULL. VA. STATE LIB. 5, 38 (1916). The number reached 148 before 1863.
716 See id.
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ship government.77 He was strongly inclined toward this stronger, more
responsive and more democratic form of local government, but Vir-
ginians were not prepared for it. In fact, when Jefferson later helped
to draft the Ordinance of 1787, which provided forms of local gov-
ernment for Illinois and other western states, he ignored the township
concept and based his plan on the Virginia county system.78 It did not
mark a change in his political philosophy, rather it reflected the practi-
calities of the situation which then existed not only in Virginia, but
also in those western states.
Aside from the traditional units of local government-cities, towns
and counties-Virginia had experience with other forms of local gov-
ernment from its earliest beginnings. The public authority and the
special district may have antedated both municipalities and counties
in Virginia.7 Although the Virginia Company was nominally a pri-
vate "corporation," its essential characteristics made it something very
close to a public corporation. s0 The special district, which is closely
akin to and often indistinguishable from the public authority, was
present in Virginia long before 1700. When the Elizabethan Poor
Law became effective in 1621,81 the special district appeared and was
used extensively from that point forward to accomplish a variety of
tasks, such as the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, and
tobacco warehouses.8 2
In 1784, George Washington and others organized the James River
Company to construct a canal westward from Richmond so that a
trade link between the eastern and western sections of the state could
be established. 3 Although the initiative and much of the capital invested
were private, the state invested public funds in the company. Some
years later, other internal improvement companies were formed for
7
7 See E. INGLE, supra note 65, at 116.
78 Id.
79 Cf. Gerwig, supra note 53, at 595.
80 The element of private gain does not in itself render the corporation "private."
Because the Virginia Company so completely ordered the lives of the settlers in the
New World, it had significant governmental qualities-more, in fact, than most modem
public authorities.
81 See PORTER, supra note 67, at 39-40.
825 W. HENrNG, THE STATUTEs AT LARGE 378 (1st ed. 1819); see S. MAIEsmu, JR. &
D. TmpLE, SPEaCAL Dmcr GovRNmEr ix VmGInA 10-11 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as MA uEsr & TEhwrm].
83 11 W. HENwc, THE STATuTEs AT LARGE 450, 510, 525 (1st ed. 1823); see C.
PEARSON, Tim R-usTER MOVEm=v IN VIRGIIA 1 (1917). See generally W. DUNA-
WAY, HISrORY oF rHm JAMES R avmR AND KANAWHA CoMPANY (1922).
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much the same purpose.8 4 When news of the great success of the Erie
Canal spread, the states along the Atlantic seaboard took a new interest
in works of internal improvdment.85 Many of them created state enter-
prises or public corporations to construct railroads and canals.8 6 Vir-
ginia, on the other hand, turned to its private internal improvement
companies, such as the James River Company (later the James River
and Kanawha Company) to provide these transportation links.8 7
The Virginia approach has been described as a "system of mixed
enterprise" because it involved heavy public investment in private corpo-
rations.88 The rationale for this system is expressed in the following
remark:
Experience testifies that [internal improvements] will be more eco-
nomically made, and better repaired, if their management be left to
the individuals who subscribe to their stock with a view to private
gain, than if confided to public officers or agents.89
In 1816, all of the state's holdings in internal improvement com-
panies were consolidated into a single Fund for Internal Improvements,
which was pledged for fifty years for the sole purpose of improving
transportation and communication. 0 The General Assembly in the
same act also established the Board of Public Works to manage the
fund and to oversee the operation of the internal improvement com-
84There were the Dismal Swamp Company (1787), the Appomattox Company
(1788), and the Rappahannock Company (1793).
85 See C. GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS,
1800-1890, 3 et seq. (1960); A. HEINs, CONSTnI ONAL RERmcToNs ON STATE DEm 3
(1963); A. HLLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDs 143-99 (1936).
86See H. ADAMS, PUBLIC DEBTS 322 (1887); C. GOOODRICH, supra note 85, at 121;
Heath, Public Railroad Construction and the Development of Private Enterprise in the
South before 1861, 10 J. EcoN. HIST. 40 (Supp. 1950).
87 See C. PERsoN, supra note 83, at 1.
88 See Goodrich, Virginia's System of Mixed Enterprise: A Study of State Planning
of Internal Improvements, 64 PoL. Sci. Q. 355, 357 (1949).
89 Id. at 360.
9 0 VA. Acts OF ASSEMBLY 1816, at 43-57; see A Collection of All Laws and Resolu-
tions of the General Assembly of Virginia Relating to the Board of Public Works;
Report of the Commissioners Appointed to View Certain Rivers 'witbin the Common-
'wealth in 1812 (Richmond 1819). On February 15, 1812, a commission was appointed
to "view certain rivers in Virginia." It was led by John Marshall and examined and
mapped certain areas of the James River, the New River and other waterways. In
December, 1815, the Committee of Roads and Internal Navigation reported that state
aid would be necessary if substantial internal improvements were to be made. It
recommended that a "proper body" be established to assist the General Assembly in
allocating funds and that a separate fund be established.
186,
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1abiies. It was recognized that state ownership of these enterprises might
conceivably be necessary or advisable, but the Assembly proceeded
on the assumption that such cases would be exceptional. A general
plan was formulated under which three-fifths of the capital was to
be raised by private subscription before public funding was allowed."1
Virginia abandoned its system of mixed enterprike after the Panic of
1837 drove private capital away from internal improvement com-
panies. 2 Mosn of the previously private enterprises became public
and, after 1838, were backed by the state's credit.3 While these com-
panies were perhaps never public authorities in the modem sense, they
were similar enough to justify a claim that Virginia's experience with
public authorities in this century was not entirely unprecedented.
Virginia's first Constitution in 1776 made little change in the form
of county government inherited from the colonial period. 4 The county
court was the central administrative body for the county. Legislative,
administrative and judicial responsibilities were merged in that body.
The system was aristocratic and self-perpetuating since the justices (or
commissioners) of the county court nominated their successors, who
were almost invariably approved by the Governor and his Privy Coun-
cil 1 The Constitution of 1830 did little to change this pattern. 6
The Constitutional Convention which met in 1850 brought signifi--
cant reform to county government by adopting two provisions. The
first "destroyed the aristocratic character of the [county] court by
making the members elective and by giving them pay ... ., The
91 This formula reflected a philosophy that was prevalent in Virginia even until the
1830's. Consider the following remarks made at the Convention of 1829-30: "Individual
enterprise was first to be called out, and then aided by the hand of government."
PRoCEEDiNGs AND DEBATEs OF Tnm VIRGINIA STATE CoNvEN-IoN OF 1829-1830, 143 (1830).
See also Goodrich, supra note 88, at 362.
9 2 The state alone assumed
the completion of certain great works of internal improvement, leaving those of
minor utility and proportions-to the support of the Board of Public Works and
individuals of whom the Board was but a co-partner.
JouRNAL. AND DoCumENTS OF Tm HousE OF DEL GATEs, 1834-35, Doc. No. I.
9 3 Va. Acts of Assembly 1838, ch. 12; see JoURNAL OF m SENATE, 1877-78, Doc.
No. 24. See generally Curtis, Debts of the States, 58 No. Am. REv. 110 (1884);
Goodrich, The Revulsion against Internal Improvements, 10 J. EcoN. HIsr. 145 (1950);
Morton, The Virginia State Debt and Internal Improvements, 1820-1838, 25 J. PoL.
EcoN. 339 (1917).
94 R. PiNCHnEcE, IAvPROVED COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINA 7 (1938).
05 Id. at 7-8.
96 See PORTER, supra note 67, at 164. See generally W. VAN SCHREVEN, THE CoN-
VmIONS AND CoNsrnTrnoNs OF VIRGINrA, 1776-1966 (1967).
07 PORTER, supra note 67, at 298.
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second created a new subunit of county government, the magisterial
district, which exists in almost the same form today in Virginia.
THE CONSTrrUTION OF 1869
The Constitutional Convention which met in 1867 and 1868 was a
curious mixture of carpetbaggers, scalawags and conservatives. 8 The
chairman of the Convention was a federal judge from New York,
John C. Underwood, whose name is often associated with the Con-
vention and the Constitution it produced. 99 The Constitution of 1869
had a profound effect upon local government in Virginia for several
reasons, but chiefly because it abandoned the magisterial district system
created by the Constitution of 1851 in favor of a township system
which was inimical to Virginia tradition.100 The concept was borrowed
from New York's local government system, no doubt owing to the
presence of thirteen New Yorkers at the Convention. 0 1
The Underwood Constitution was the first to provide a classification
of municipalities based on population.0 2 It raised from 5,000 to 10,000
the minimum population required before a new county could be
formed.10 3 Road and school districts were created within each county,
using the township as the base for each district, but allowing further
subdivision within the township. 0 4 A foundation for the first state-wide
system of public, free schools was laid by a mandate to that effect in
section three of article eight. 05 Every city was required to elect a
mayor who was to be its chief executive officer. 00 Special legislation
pertaining to the organization and government of cities was forbidden
"except in cases where, in the judgment of the General Assembly, the
object of such act cannot be attained by general laws." 107
98 See PORTER, supra note 67, at 243. See generally DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
VIRGINIA CONSTTUTIONAL CONVENTION 1867-68 (1868); A. LONG, THE CONSTITUTION OF
VIRGINIA (1901); A. MoGER, VIRGINIA: BOURBONISM TO BYRD, 1870-1925, at 5-8 (1968);
C. PEARSON, THE READJUSTER MovE ENT IN VIRGINIA 17-23 (1917).
99 C. PEARSON, supra note 98, at 17.
1 00 VA. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1869); see H. ECKENRODE, PoLITCAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA
DURING RECONSTRUCTION 102 (1904); PORTER, supra note 67, at 245, 248-51.
101 See PORTER, supra note 67, at 245.
1 0 2 VA. CoNsr. art. VI, § 14 (1869); see A BoDY INcoEpORA-E, supra note 18, at 17-18.
1 03 VA. CoNsT. art. V, § 19 (1869); see PORTER, supra note 67, at 243.
10 4 VA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 3, 4 (1869); see MAKrIESKI & TEMPLE, supra note 82,
at 14-19; PORTER, supra note 67, at 249.
105See J. BUCK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN VIRGINIA, 1607-1952, at
65-69 (1952); PORTER, supra note 67, at 291 et seq.
10 6 VA. CoNsT. art. V, § 19 (1869).
107 VA. CONST. art. V, § 20 (1869).
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One of the most significant provisions was that which 'created the
board of supervisors for each county and established the single-judge
county court, thereby divorcing judicial functions from administrative
and legislative functions for the first time in Virginia county govern-
ment. 08
FROM 1870 TO 1902
The township concept, introduced by the Underwood Constitution 09
and put into effect at the first session of the General Assembly follow-
ing the adoption of that Constitution," 0 had a very brief lifespan in Vir-
ginia. Immediate and widespread dissatisfaction made the plan difficult,
if not impossible, to implement; thus, in 1874, an amendment eliminated
the township and reestablished the magisterial district as the subunit
of county government."'
The new provision allowed as many magisterial districts as were
appropriate in each county, but no less than three."2 They differed
from townships in that the latter "were real units of government with
certain independent powers, while the magisterial districts were not,
and in that the [supervisor under the township form] had definite du-
ties connected with the government of the township in addition to his
powers as a member of the county board... ." 11
Abolition of the township, however, did not mean an end to some
of the institutions that accompanied its creation. The county school
and road districts, which were new to Virginia and which were co-
terminous with townships, survived the 1874 amendment.1 4 When the
state returned to county magisterial districts, passage of a general law
made the county court once again responsible for road construction
and maintenance." 5 Yet shortly thereafter, the counties of Loudoun,
Fairfax and Fauquier by special acts were exempted from the general
law, and were allowed to operate under a road-district system similar
to that which had been in effect under the township plan. 16 Other
108 See PoRTER, supra note 67, at 244-45.
1 0 9 VA. CONsT. art. VII, § 2 (1869).
110 Va. Acts of Assembly 1869-70, ch. 39; see PoRTER, supra note 67, at 251.
111 Va. Acts of Assembly 1874-75, ch. 76; see PORThR, supra note 67, at 271.
112 VA. CONSr. art. VII, § 2 (1869).
113 PoRTER, supra note 67, at 245.
114 See MA.xxLsas & TF.NiPLE, supra note 82, at 13-14.
115 Va. Acts of Assembly 1874-75, ch. 181.11 Va. Acts of Assembly 1874-75, ch. 87 (Loudoun); 1875-76, ch. 92 (Fauquier);
1875-76, ch. 258 (Fairfax).
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special legislation spread this road district system to many of the
remaining counties."17
To effectuate the broad mandate in the Constitution of 1869 that
a state-wide system of public, free schools be set up, the Convention of
1867-68 created the township school-district system."" Following the
demise of the township, the school-district system was incorporated,
with little but geographical change, into the resurrected magisterial-
district system.119 The county boards were authorized to subdivide
the school district into as many units "as may be deemed necessary." 12
0
Although the early period in the development of school districts was
fraught with difficulties, the system greatly improved public education
and, of particular importance in the context of this article, it con-
tributed to the pattern of "strongly localized government units cre-
ated to handle major public services" which provided the foundation
for the emergence of special districts in the twentieth century. 2'
One of the most noteworthy features of the last third of the nine-
teenth century was the accelerated growth of towns and cities. 22 Dur-
ing the Civil War, the socio-economic fabric of Virginia was rent.
The plantation economy, which had remained relatively unaltered since
the seventeenth century, was undermined not only by the destruction
and havoc of war, but also by the elimination of the principal factor
which sustained the plantation-slavery.2 3 Following emancipation,
many Negroes joined the migration to towns and cities, causing a
sharp rise in the population and number of municipalities in Virginia.
This trend has continued ever since.4
In 1880, the youngest Virginia County, Dickenson, was created by
an Act of the General Assembly. 25 It is undoubtedly the last new
county that will ever be formed in Virginia, although in theory the
constitutional power still remains with the General Assembly. The
117 See MAKIELSKI & TEMPiE, supra note 82, at 15.
118 VA. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1869); See J. BucK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBrac
SC1OOLS INt VIRGINI, 1607-1952, at 65 (1952).
119 See MAEIE.SKI & TM-pLE, supra note 82, at 18.
120 VA. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1869); see PORTER, supra note 67, at 293.
12 1 MAmLSKt & TEMPLE, supra note 82, at 18.
122 See H. McBAIN, supra note 65, at 118.
123 See INGLE, supra note 65, at 119.
124See H. McBAIN, supra note 65, at 118; RuRAL AFFAias STUDY COMM'N, REPORT
1 (1969); Gedel, Growth of Virginia Counties, 1790-1920, 2 U. VA. NEws LE-tER Oc-
tober 1, 1925, at 1.
M Va. Acts of Assembly 1879-80, ch. 140; see VALC, GovERraMFNTAL SUBDIVISIONS IN
VIRGINIA 7 (1955).
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Constitution of 1869 had greatly circumscribed that power.'.20 Due to
the undesirability of local units which are too small and too poor to,
support minimal services, the likelihood of any new county being
carved out in the Commonwealth is remote indeed since Virginia coun-
ties -are already small in comparison to those in other states.12 7
Although the number of special acts passed by the General As-
sembly relating to local government is still a matter of concern, it
was a particular problem during the period between 1870 and 1902.128
Consider, for example, the following passage from Porter:
Another characteristic of the period is the flood of special laws
relating to counties. Since the actual power given to counties was
limited to routine administration and since this was carefully regu-
lated by law, any unusual circumstance made a special grant of power
necessary and the counties were continually running to the legislature
for special bills of one sort or another. During the last quarter of
the century there was a total of two thousand three hundred forty-
six special laws passed. Well over half of this number came in the
last ten years. If the special acts concerning cities and towns were
added, the total would be more than doubled. Much of this, of course,
resulted from the increasing tempo of American life which was put-
ting an increasing strain on the old machinery of local administration,
but much of it was due to defects in this machinery as well.1 29
Virginia's first modem public health system appeared in 1900 when
the General Assembly created a state board of health and required
that local boards be set up in every county and city. ° These local
boards were given "broad powers in the matter of sanitation, control
of contagious diseases, and vaccination . ,, 131
Between 1870 and 1902, the chief sources of local revenue were the
poll tax (maintained at a very high rate after the Civil War for polit-
ical reasons), license taxes, general property taxes, and certain other
miscellaneous taxes. 32 In 1880 counties were granted taxing power
12 See PoRERa, supra note 67, at 230.
2 7 Virginia, with 40,815 square miles, has 96 counties. In the nation as a whole,
there are 3,615,210 square miles and only 3049 counties. U. S. DE'T oF COZYMMRCE,
BUREAu OF TmE CEN Sus, ComNTY AND Crry DATA BooK 610 (1968).
128 See PORTMI, supra note 67, at 265, 280-81, 301.
12 ) d. at 301.
130 Va. Acts of Assembly 1899-1900, ch. 1146, amended 1901-02, ch. 317.
131 See PORTER, supra note 67, at 291.
13 2 See H. ECKERODE, POLITICAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 72
(1904); PORTeR, supra note 67, at 281.
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over the real estate of railroads;133 and in 1882, they were allowed to
tax telegraph lines.'34
Local debt was not a significant factor in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century.3 5 Counties had no general power to borrow money,
but special legislation provided the authority in boards of supervisors
to create debt for specific purposes. 3 6 Some latitude was given coun-
ties, however, by an act passed in 1874 which permitted borrowing
for the construction and repair of public buildings.137
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1902
In theory, Virginia is still functioning under the Constitution of
1902, but the provisions pertaining to local government have been so
often and so drastically amended that there is little resemblance be-
tween the present document and the document produced by the 1901-
02 Constitutional Convention. Nevertheless, the amendments have been
largely permissive, as have the statutes which implemented them. The
voters of each county and city were permitted to decide for them-
selves whether they would abandon the rigid system ordained by the
1901-02 Convention. As a result, the conservative attitude of Virginia's
rural populace precluded radical county government change in coun-
ties outside of the metropolitan areas; but all of the cities and some
suburban counties have taken advantage of the amended provisions by
abandoning the archaic system imposed by the original provisions of
the 1902 Constitution in favor of governmental forms tailored to
local needs. 38
The 1901-02 Convention shackled cities with a "strong mayor" form
of government.139 Those with a population of 10,000 or more were to
elect a mayor and to adopt a bicameral council plan. 140 The powers and
duties of the mayor were set out in detail, leaving less flexibility than
was desirable; moreover, the two branches of council were so large
133 Va. Acts of Assembly 1879-80, ch. 106, amended 1881-82, ch. 221; see A. MOGER,
supra note 98, at 49.
134 Va. Acts of Assembly 1882 (Ex. Sess.) § 24, ch. 119; see PORTER, supra note 67, at
281.
135 PORTER, supra note 67, at 288.
136 Id. at 265.
137 Va. Acts of Assembly 1873-74, ch. 300.
138 All of Virginia's cities have adopted the city-manager form of government.
Wheeler, Virginia and the Council-Manager Plan, 42 U. VA. NEws LErER 33 (1966).
139 CCR REPORT 214.
140 VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 120, 121 (1902).
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and unruly that coordinated city government was a virtual impos-
sibility.'
Another provision relating to cities and towns prohibited special
legislation in regard to their government and organization, but a
grandfather clause left existing charters unaffected. 14 Special acts were
also forbidden for the extension or contraction of corporate bound-
aries.1
43
Counties fared no better. A uniform state-wide system of govern-
ment was prescribed which completely ignored the problem of ac-
commodating the needs of individual localities.:' 4 The provisions deal-
ing with county government, just as those relating to cities and towns,
denied localities a strong, flexible form of government and made re-
form impossible without constitutional amendment.
THE CHA GING FoRms OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 1902-1928
The single form of government required in all cities and towns in
Virginia by the Constitution of 1902 was an overly elaborate and
cumbersome one. The unwieldly bicameral council arrangement was
the most often criticized feature of the Virginia constitutional plan,
and seemed especially unsuited for city government in the twentieth
century.14 The advent of the automobile and a growing concentration
of people in urban areas sharply increased the number of services which
cities were expected to provide.14 The demand for street lights and
paved streets, among other things, was not being adequately or efficiently
handled by the existing governmental structure. Cities needed a more
businesslike method for meeting such demands.
In 1908 the City of Staunton decided to hire a manager to
provide a more efficient means of dispensing municipal services
by circumventing the slow, complex and often frustrating procedure
141See L. HoDES, REORGANIZATION OF MUNIcIMA. GowvmUNTr IN VIRGINIA 2 (1915).
142 VA. CoNsr. art. VII, § 117 (1902).
14 3 VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 126 (1902).
144 CCR REPoRT 214. For a broad discussion of the 1902 Constitution and a descrip-
tion of the Convention, see generally R. MCDAN-L, TuE VIRGINIA CONST17ITUONAL
CONVENTION oF 1901-02 (1928); A. MoGER, VIRGINIA: Boumowsm To BY'D, 1870-1925,
198 (1968); Holt, The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901-1902: A Reform
Movement Which Lacked Substance, 76 VA. MAO. Hist. & BtoG. 67 (1968). See also
PROCEEDINGS AND DEuAVES oF Tml CONSnITToNAL CoNv irloN (1906).
145 See, e.g, L. HODGES, REORGANIzATION OF MUNCIPAL GovERN ENT n VIRGINIA 2
(1915).
140 See ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 235.
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to which it had been tied. 47 This concentration of responsibility and
control in a single individual permitted Staunton to achieve significant
results. In taking this step, Staunton became the first city in the coun-
try to adopt what was to become known as the "city-manager plan"
or the "council-manager plan." 14s It set in motion a reform movement
in municipal government that is perhaps the most significant of this
century. 49
Because of the requirements of the Virginia Constitution, this new
Staunton plan had to be engrafted on the traditional form of municipal
government. The Constitution was amended, however, in 1912 to al-
low cities to adopt their own form of government.!0 In 1914 the Gen-
eral Assembly enacted legislation to implement the constitutional
change.' 51 Another constitutional amendment in 1920 expressly au-
thorized the adoption of the city-manager form by cities and towns. 52
Today every Virginia city and most of Virginia's towns have adopted
a manager plan.153
Although real reform came more slowly to Virginia counties than
to its cities, county reform in Virginia also established a pattern for
the rest of the country. Prompted by a number of studies of county
inefficiency in Virginia, Governor Byrd urged constitutional revision
to allow counties to adopt a plan of government less cumbersome than
the traditional plan under which all Virginia counties were then re-
quired to operate. 1 4
The Constitution of 1902 had provided only one form of govern-
ment for counties. Under this traditional system, both legislative and
administrative functions are vested in the board of supervisors, who
147 See W. GRUBERT, TE ORIGIN OF THE CITY MANAGER PLAN IN STAUNTON, VIRGINIA
(1954).
14 8 See Stoneham, Fifty Years of City Manager Government In Virginia, 34 U. VA.
NEws LE=rER (April 14, 1958), reprinted in READINGS IN VA. Gov'T 171; Wheeler,
Virginia and the Council-Manager Plan, 42 U. VA. NEws L-E=E 33 (1966).
149 See ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 223-27. There is a suggestion, however, that
the council-manager plan is losing ground to the mayor-manager plan. See Austin,
Leadership in Council-Manager Government, 46 U. VA. NEws LE ER 9, 12 (1969).
Yet the economies derived from the use of the council-manager plan are generally
recognized. See, e.g., Booms, City Governmental Form and Public Expenditure Levels,
19 NAT'L TAx J. 187 (1966).
150 Va. Acts of Assembly 1912, ch. 28, at 52-54, amending VA. CoNsT. art. 8, 1 117.
15 1 Va. Acts of Assembly 1914, chs. 138, 165, at 224-25, 269-70.
152 Va. Acts of Assembly 1920, ch. 350, at 520-23, amending VA. CoNsT. art. 8, 5 117.
1-S See Cooper, Updating Local Govermnent in Virginia: The Postwar Period and
Beyond, 43 U. VA. NEws LETrER 13, 14 (1966); Wheeler, supra note 148, at 33.
15 4 See Pinchbeck, Origins and Evolution of County Government in Virginia, 1 U.
RICH. INsT. FOR Bus. & COMMUNITY DEV. NEWSLaEEmR 3, 5 (1968).
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are representatives from (but not of) the magisterial districts of- the
county. 15 The board nominally exercises general control of the Affairs
of the county; it not only makes policy, but executes it as well.156 Yet
the latitude of the board is circumscribed by the prerogatives of a
number of constitutional officers elected in each county operating un-
der the traditional plan: treasurer, sheriff, commonwealth's attorney,
clerk, and commissioner of revenue. 151 They are called constitutional
officers because their posts cannot be abolished except by constitutional
amendment.
In 1915 an independent study by LeRoy Hodges was one of the
first to dramatize the deplorable condition of county government in
Virginia and to suggest a reorganization to provide a more efficient
and responsive government.' 58 He found that counties operated with-
out central leadership, and that
the Constitutional Convention of 1902 shackled the counties of Vir-
ginia with a prescribed form of government which, in the majority of
them, provides a job for about one out of every ten votes and virtually
places the selection of these job-holders in the hands of the job-
seekers themselves. The result is that instead of an efficient, repre-
sentative and responsive county government, the rural people of Vir-
ginia find themselves at the mercy of a dangerously topheavy, un-
related, non-cooperative, inefficient, unbusinesslike and, in some cases,
corrupt system of local government. 5 9
He saw that the traditional system afforded county government no
central leadership, and recommended a "controlled-executive plan,"
the basic features of which would be simplicity, responsiveness, and
direct responsibility. There was no justification, in his opinion, for
the fundamental difference between city and county governmental
structures. "The only real difference . . . is merely in detail and in-
tensity of organization." 1I
The catalyst which led to constitutional reform, however, was the
155 See G. JENNGs, VmGiNA's Govm mNrr 113 (1968).
156 See Long, Virginia Counties Turn to an Executive Secretary, 40 U. VA. NEws
LErE33 (1964).
15 7 VA. CONST. art 7, § 110.
358 L. HODCES, REORGAIZATION OF CoUNTY GovEsuENT'r IN VMGINIA (1915).
159 Id. at 1. See also CCR REPORT 214.
1 0L. HODGF_S, supra note 158, at 3. The Report of the Virginia Commission on
Simplification and Economy of State and Local Government in 1924 repeated many of
the observations of Hodges and urged reorganization of county government particularly
to correct fiscal and administrative inadequacies.
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study commissioned by Governor Byrd and presented to him in 1927
by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research. The following pas-
sage fairly summarizes the report's findings:
In our study of Virginia county government we were particularly
impressed by the scattered, disjointed and irresponsible type of
organization that exists in all the counties ....
The present county government . . . is without a chief adminis-
trative officer and the board of supervisors controls through appoint-
ment only a small part of the county administration .... The voters
of the county have very little power in the determination of county
policies .... In fact, there is nothing to commend the present form
of county government in Virginia. In many of the counties it is grossly
political, careless, wasteful, and thoroughly inefficient. It has been
that way for many years, but still it exists and seems to flourish.
Perhaps the reason for this is that the people of the State have not
yet become aware of the possibility of establishing a different form
of county government, which is less costily, more efficient, and better
able to meet modern conditions.161
THE 1928 CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION AND OPTIONAL FORMS OF
COUNTY GOVERNMENT
A thorough revision of the 1902 Constitution was begun in 1927
and the resulting amendments were ratified in 1928. The most notable
change in regard to cities, towns, and counties was the amendment to
section 110 which allowed the General Assembly to enact general laws
providing for the adoption by voters in each county of forms of county
organization and government different from the traditional form. To
permit this, a provision was added to section 110 which removed the
restrictions on the election or appointment of county officers to allow
for the creation of executive positions contemplated by the new forms
of government recommended in the reports discussed in the preceding
section.
At its 1930 session, the General Assembly approved a law which
enabled Arlington County to adopt a modified county-manager form
of government. 1 2 It was the first county in the United States to do
so by popular vote.'63 The residents of Arlington had seen the ad-
161 N. Y. BuRE-Au OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH, REPORT 5-6 (1927).
162 Va. Acts of Assembly 1930, ch. 167, at 450-56.
163 Reid, Arlington County Adopts the Manager Plan, 20 NAT'L MN. REv. 127
(1931).
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vantages of the city-manager plan as a result of the 1922 campaign
there for incorporation as a city." For at least two years before the
adoption of the county manager form, Arlington had been using a
"directing engineer" who performed many of the administrative duties
which would otherwise have been handled by the board of super-
visors.
16 5
Also at the 1930 session, the General Assembly established the Vir-
ginia Commission on County Government to draft a general law to
implement the amendment to section 110.166 The commission's legis-
lative proposal was submitted to the 1932 Assembly as the Optional
Forms Act. 67 It contained two new forms of county organization,
the County Manager Form and the County Executive Form. The
differences between the two are insubstantial.168
Under the County Manager Plan, administrative functions are di-
vorced from legislative functions (insofar as that is possible) and vested
in the manager.6 9 The board of supervisors, still popularly elected, is
left with legislative powers only. County activities are divided into
seven departments: finance, public works, public welfare, law enforce-
ment, education, public health, and county records, all under the
supervision of the county manager to promote efficiency and economy.
That County Executive Plan differs from the County Manager Plan
in that "the board of supervisors upon the recommendation of the
county executive appoints administrative officers and employees; while
the manager, direcdy responsible to the board for administration, ap-
points administrative officers." 170
Five referenda were held in the first two years after the Optional
Forms Act was passed, but only Henrico and Albemarle adopted one
or the other of these plans.' 7 ' Within several years, two more referenda
184 1d. at 127-28.
105 Id. at 129.
166 Va. Acts of Assembly 1930, ch. 268, at 689-90; see Corson, The Year 1930 in the
History of Virginia Counties, 20 NAT'L Muxr. REv. 197 (1931); Spicer, Virginia's
Progress in County Govermnent, 28 AM. Pot.. Scr. REv. 1074 (1934).
167 Va. Acts of Assembly 1932, ch. 368, at 727-52.
168See VA. METROPOLITAN AREAS STUnY CoVrM'N, GOVERNING THE VIRGINIA METRO-
PoLrTAN AREAS: AN ASSESSMENT 17 (1967).
160 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-622 to -660 (1964); see VA. STATE CHAmER OF COMMERCE,
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMY IN COUrY GovERNMENT IN VIRGINIA 56 (1947). See
generally G. SPICER, TEN YEARS OF COUNTY MANAGER GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINIA (1945).
170 Pate, Virginia's Experience with New Forms of County Government, 24 NAT'L
Mui. REv. 265 (1935).
171 See VA. COMM'N ON CotmY GoV'T, REPORT, 14 (1940); Spicer, supra note 166,
at 1077.
19701
19§' UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:174
were conducted and both failed. 172 In 1945, Warwick County adopted
the County Manager Plan and operated under that form until it be-
came a city. 73 The residents of Fairfax County approved the County
Executive Plan in 1952.174
Special legislation has provided for a limited departure from the
traditional form of county government without the need to adopt one
of the optional forms. As early as 1928, Augusta County was allowed
to create the post of clerk of the board of supervisors who was
independent of the county clerk. 75 Other special acts permitted the
counties of Chesterfield (1942),176 Fairfax (1944) ,177 and Elizabeth
City (1946)178 to appoint a county executive secretary without a refer-
endum. The County Executive Secretaries Act of 1950 provided a
general law similar to the special laws applicable to those three coun-
ties.179 It exempts four counties (Caroline, Essex, Northumberland, and
King and Queen) from its application. The fundamental problems re-
lated to the traditional form of county organization are hardly elimi-
nated by this approach, and it is not intended to be a substitute for
the optional forms. 180 But because it does involve a popular vote,
the County Executive Secretaries Act makes possible a more ef-
ficient system for dispensing urban services in counties which are just
beginning to feel urban pressures, yet are not prepared to approve
radical change in their governmental structure..
8
Another optional form, the County Board Form, was added in
1940.1-2 It was originally enacted for adoption in Fairfax County, but
was never approved by the voters there.'83 An amendment in 1950
extended its applicability to include Elizabeth City County which did
172 See R. PINCHBECK, IMPROVED CouNTY GovEPAEmNr IN VIRGINIA (1938).
173 See VA. STATE CHAMBER OF COMmERCE, supra note 169, at 59.
174 Earlier in 1945, Fairfax County had turned to an executive secretary as the result
of a special act. Va. Acts of Assembly 1944, ch. 204, at 293-97.
175 See VA. STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 169, at 59.
170 Va. Acts of Assembly 1942, ch. 389, at 624-25.
177 Va. Acts of Assembly 1944, ch. 204, at 293-97.
178 Va. Acts of Assembly 1946, ch. 373, at 653.
179 Va. Acts of Assembly 1950, chs. 106, 388, at 123-27, 694-97; see Long, Virginia
Counties Turn to an Executive Secretary, 40 U. VA. NEws LET ER 33, 34 (1964).
The executive secretary was an adjunct of the County Board Form.
180 See Long, supra note 179, at 34.
'
8 1 See VA. METROPOLITAN AREAs STuDY COMM'N, GOVERNING VRGrHA'S METRO-
PoLITAN AREAs 17 (1967).
182 Va. Acts of Assembly 1940, ch. 396, at 696-706.
183 The Act does not expressly mention Fairfax County.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 1
adopt it."4 A later amendment made it available to aiy county.185 Since
Elizabeth City County became a city in 1952 as a result of its merger
with Warwick, only Scott County operates under this form. There is
very little, however, to distinguish the County Board Form from the
County Executive Secretaries Act.
A Modified Commission Plan was authorized by the General As-
sembly for Arlington County in 1930,:16 but was never adopted by
that county. Under this plan, all governmental powers, whether legis-
lative, administrative or executive, were to be vested in a board of five
commissioners with certain specified functions assigned to each.
In 1960 the Urban County Form was authorized by the General
Assembly and intended for adoption only in Fairfax County.8 7 It is
patterned after the County Executive and County Manager Forms,
but amendments added in 1966 rearranged sanitary districts to pro-
vide for greater efficiency and better planning, with these new, larger
districts serving as electoral divisions for election of supervisors. The
board is granted broad power and flexibility so that it may provide
urban services without undue restriction.88
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW FORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT-
THE URBAN CoUNTY
One of the strongest traditions in Virginia and the one that gives
city-county separation its reason for being is that "urban areas should
be under urban government and rural areas under county govern-
ment." -'s As the Hahn Commission observed, however, this concept
has been undermined by the erratic growth experienced in metropolitan
areas and by the grant of additional powers to counties. 00 Today in
Virginia, many counties exercise the same powers and provide es-
sentially the same services as do their neighboring cities. 191
So complete has been the merging of city and suburban county func-
tions that in 1950 the General Assembly enacted legislation which
184 Va. Acts of Assembly 1950, ch. 106, at 123-27.
18 5 Va. Acts of Assembly 1962, ch. 623, at 1101.
18 6 Va. Acts of Assembly 1930, ch. 167, at 450-52, as amended, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-670 to -673 (1964).
18 tVa. Acts of Assembly 1960, ch. 382, at 571-92, as amended VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-722 to -791 (1964).
18 8 See G. JENNNGS, VmunNA's Gov NmENT 111 (1968).
189 County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 1045, 45 SE.2d 136, 142
(1947).
10 HAHN iREPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
19 1 See A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 18, at 110.
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gave certain counties "the same powers and authority" as are extended
to cities and towns under Virginia law.19 This statute was amended in
1958 to extend its effect to other suburban counties,193 and finally in
1966 to extend to all counties in Virginia.'94 In Board of Supervisors v.
Corbett, 95 however, it was held that the powers granted to counties
under this statute do not include powers exercised by cities and towns by
reason of a special charter provision, but only those powers conferred
upon municipalties by general law. Since cities derive most of their
powers from charter provisions adopted by the electors of the city
and approved by the General Assembly, the sweeping grant of sec-
tion 15.1-522 is not as broad in practical effect as it may first appear.
This has been corrected by resort to special legislation for counties,
enacted ostensibly as "general legislation" but confined to certain coun-
ties as the need arises, usually by reference to population levels.' 9" Al-
though this approach runs afoul of the spirit of section 63 of the Con-
stitution, this practice has been upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals as a valid exercise of legislative power and as a general
classification in spite of the fact that the limiting language of the statute
may confine its application to a single county.
19 7
This special legislation approach was used as early as 1918 to allow
the counties surrounding cities of over 30,000 to "install and maintain
suitable lights on the streets and highways in the villages and build up
portions of such counties respectively. . . ." "s Other special acts fol-
lowed the 1918 act and further extended the powers of certain coun-
ties.1 99
Of perhaps only historical note is the appearance of drainage districts
after a 1910 enabling act.20 9 Counties were authorized to set up such
192 Va. Acts of Assembly 1950, ch. 100, at 113-14.
193 Va. Acts of Assembly 1958, ch. 190, at 251-52.
194 Va. Acts of Assembly 1966, chs. 405, 495, at 592-94, 675-76 [codified at VA. CODE
AN. § 15.1-522 (1964)].
195 206 Va. 167, 142 S.E.2d 504 (1965).
196 See Bohannon, Local Bills-Some Observations, 42 VA. L. REv. 845, 854 (1956).
See also Note, Special Legislation in Virginia, 42 VA. L. REv. 860 (1956).
'
9 7 See Newport News v. Elizabeth City County, 189 Va. 825, 55 S.E.2d 56 (1949);
Gandy v. Elizabeth City County, 179 Va. 340, 19 S.E.2d 97 (1942); Martin's Ex'rs v.
Commonwealth, 126 Va. 603, 102 S.E. 77 (1920). But cf. County Bd. of Supervisors v.
American Trailer Co., 193 Va. 72, 68 S.E.2d 115 (1951); Quesinberry v. Hull, 159 Va.
270, 165 S.E. 382 (1932). Compare Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219, 72 S.E.2d 506 (1952),
'with Joy v. Green, 194 Va. 1003, 76 S.E.2d 178 (1953).
198 Va. Acts of Assembly 1918, ch. 51, at 105.
199 Va. Acts of Assembly 1930, ch. 125, at 341-42; Va. Acts of Assembly 1932, ch.
273, at 481-82.
200 Va. Acts of Assembly 1910, ch. 312, at 474-85.
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districts for "ditching and draining the wet, swamp and overflowed
lands of the State." Although these entities resembled the sanitary dis-
tricts which were to appear later, they were never an important factor
because so few were created. °1
In 1926 the General Assembly provided for the creation of sanitary
districts within certain counties.02 Four years later, a sanitary district
law of general applicability was passed. -0 3 Such legislation was a sig-
nificant step making it possible for counties to provide a limited num-
ber of urban services to those areas within the counties which were
highly developed. Sanitary districts are authorized by state law, but
come into existence only upon the petition of the requisite number of
voters in the proposed district.20 Bonds may be issued by these dis-
tricts with the approval of the county to finance water systems, garb-
age collection and disposal, sewerage, street lighting and other proj-
ects. 20 5 The most important characteristic of these entities is that they
constitute special taxing districts within the county for the purposes
for which they are created, but remain under the control of the gov-
erning body of the county.200 As a consequence, counties are able to
avoid the impact of section 168 of the Constitution which requires uni-
formity of taxation "within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax...." Establishing sanitary districts with well-defined bound-
aries permits special levies upon persons within such boundaries for
the additional services provided therein.
The range of permissible activities of sanitary districts has been
broadened since the 1930 act to include so many additional powers
that a listing of them here is impractical. 07 Moreover, the passage of
the Public Facilities District Law in 1946 allowed certain counties to
exercise powers even broader than those granted under the Sanitary
District Laws. 08 The public facilities district is practically unlimited
in what it can provide in the way of public services.
201 See MAKI.SKI & TEMPLE, supra note 82, at 19.
2 02 Va. Acts of Assembly 1926, ch. 339, at 604-28; see MAaxwuc & TEMPL, supra
note 82, at 24; VALC, GoVER MENTAL SuBDIVIsIONs IN VRGiNIA 15 (1955).
203 Va. Acts of Assembly 1930, ch. 460, at 1001-04.
2 0 4 VA. CODE ANN. § 21-113 (1960).
20r VA. CODE ANN. § 21-122 (1960).
2 0 6 VA. CODE ANN. § 21-119 (1960); see G. JENNNGS, VmrGA'S GovmNMENT 120
(1968); MAKIELsE! & TEMPLE, supra note 82, at 23.
2 0 7 See generally VA. CODE ANNmT. §§ 21-118 to -120 (1960).
208 Va. Acts of Assembly 1946, ch. 93; see VALC, GOVEAMENTAL UNiTs IN VIRGrINA
16 (1955). The act originally applied only to Elizabeth City County, but was amended
to apply to Fairfax County. Va. Acts of Assembly 1952, ch. 363.
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The General Assembly has established or has enacted enabling legis-
lation which would permit localities to establish several different public
authorities to provide specialized services. Among them are park au-
thorities, water and sewer authorities, public recreational facilities au-
thorities, authorities for the development of former federal areas, hos-
pital or health commissions, housing authorities, airport authorities,
parking authorities, produce market authorities, and redevelopment and
urban renewal authorities. 0 9 These developments have made it possible
for a vast array of urban services to be provided outside of Virginia's
cities, but the price has been a hodge-podge of overlapping statutes
causing confusion, administrative difficulty, and troublesome planning
problems.210
One commentator in 1963 observed that special legislation and other
factors have made it possible for certain highly-developed counties to
acquire a closer resemblance to cities than to traditional counties. 1
Because these counties have been granted such a complete range of
powers usually exercised by cities, he referred to them as "urban coun-
ties," and suggested that they may become a hybrid unit of local gov-
ernment in Virginia, distinct from both city and traditional county.
In passing legislation in 1960 allowing certain counties to adopt an urban
county form of government,212 the General Assembly may have tacitly
recognized that proposition.2' s
LOCAL TAXATION AND FINANCE
Cities and counties rely heavily on property taxes.214 Real property
209A collection of the laws relating to these Virginia public authorities, special
districts, etc., may be found in McSweeney, Limitations on the Power of the General
Assembly to Incur Debt (Memorandum to the Comm'n on Const. Revision, July 17,
1968). See also Maldelski, The Special District Problem in Virginia, 55 VA. L. REv.
1182 (1969).
2 1
o Cf. MAKJELSKI & TEMPLE, supra note 82, at 116-17.
211 Griffin, Units of Local Government in Virginia, 1962, 40 U. VA. NEws LETrER 1,
4 (1963). See also A BoDY INCORPORAAE, supra note 18, at 110.
212 Va. Acts of Assembly 1960, ch. 382.
213 The General Assembly, however, would not go so far as to adopt the proposal
of the Commission on Constitutional Revision that counties with a population of
25,000 or more be allowed to adopt a charter. CCR Draft, art. VII, §§ 1, 2. Such a
change would have made the urban county almost indistinguishable from a municipal
corporation.
214 RtuAL AFFAIRS STUDY COMM'N, REPORT 29 (1969); Horsley, Developments
Bearing on the Future of Taxation in Virginia, 12vTH ANN. WM. & MARY TAX CoNY.
PROCEDINGS 7 (1966); Mitchell, The Financial and Fiscal Implications of Urban Growth,
37 VA. MuiN. REV. 21 (1960). See also COMM. FOR ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 8 (1966).
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and tangible personal property, except the rolling stock of public ser-
vice corporations, are reserved for local taxation.2 1' Because they are
made by the localities themselves (except in the case of public service
corporations where assessment of property subject to local taxation is
made by the State Corporation Commission), assessments vary from
locality to locality.2 16 The Constitution requires assessment at fair mar-
ket value,217 but most cities and counties apply their tax rates to a per-
centage of the full value. In Washington County in 1966, for example,
assessments of real property were at 5.9%; while in the City of Rich-
mond, they were at 86.3 %.218 Counties generally have used a very low
percentage in order to increase the burden of local taxation borne by
public service corporations whose property is assessed by the SCC
at forty percent of fair market value.
The other taxes traditionally imposed by local units are not par-
ticularly significant,219 but some of the recently initiated local taxes,
especially the sales tax, have had a great impact. When it became obvi-
ous that a new source of revenue had to be found if essential urban
needs were to be met, Virginia cities began to turn to a tax on certain
sales within their corporate limits. On July 1, 1964, Norfolk became
the first locality in Virginia to impose such a tax 2 0 Within one year, all
six of the cities in the Hampton Roads area had such a tax. 21 Cities
in other parts of the state began to impose the sales tax. Several sub-
urban counties, realizing that this tax did not drive business away
from those cities which collected it, also became interested in using it,
but were not permitted by law to do so under existing statutes . 22
An areawide sales tax plan for Hampton Roads failed, and pressure
2 1GVa. Const. art. XII, §§ 168, 171 (1902); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-9 (1969). The
original § 169 of the Constitution of 1902 provided that after January 1, 1913, the
General Assembly would not be prohibited from segregating classes of property for
local taxation only. See generally Sager, Property Classification for Taxation, 43 VA.
L. REv. 1325 (1957).
210 See Va. Dep't of Taxation, Real Estate Taxes in Virginia: Real Estate Assessment
Ratios and Average Effective True Tax Rates in Virginia Counties and Cities-1964
and 1966 (mimeo. 3 pp., June 1, 1967).
2 1 7 VA. CoNsr. art. XIJ, § 169 (1902).
218 See Va. Dep't of Taxation, supra note 216.
210 See VA. DEP'T OF TAXAtON, RFPORT FOR TnE FiscAL YEAR ENDING JuNE 30, 1969
(1969).
220 Reed, A City Sales Tax: Norfolk's First Year, 42 U. VA. NEws LE=rrR 9 (1965).
221 1d.
'222 Board of Supervisors v. Corbett, 206 Va. 167, 142 S.E.2d 504 (1965); see Horsley,
supra note 214, at 8.
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for a state sales tax began to mount.22 The Norfolk experiment threat-
ened to spread to all of the cities of the state, leaving counties at a dis-
advantage. For this reason, the political opposition to the state sales
tax which had thwarted such legislation for years was finally over-
come in 1966,224 less than two years after Norfolk began to collect its
sales tax. This legislation provided for a state sales tax at 2% until
January 1, 1968, when the rate was increased to 3%. Each locality is
given the option to add to the sales tax another 1 /o which is not sub-
ject to the sales tax distribution formula, but which remains in the local
unit that collects it.
More recently, cities turned to what is popularly called an "oc-
cupation tax" to raise badly needed revenues and to equalize the im-
balance caused by benefit spillovers. An occupation tax is imposed upon
resident and non-resident alike, and is intended to make the latter bear
part of the cost of services which the cities provide to those who work
therein. Richmond's occupation tax was upheld by the Supreme Court
of Appeals in City of Richmond v. Fary.2 5 The tax there is imposed
only upon those (1) who earn $3,100 or more, (2) who work in the
city 120 days or more each year, and (3) who pay no license tax. The
court distinguished the occupation tax from the "payroll tax," which is
forbidden by both § 58-851.2 of the Virginia Code and § 2.02(a) of the
Charter of the City of Richmond. Claimed violations of due process
and equal protection were not found by the court under either the
federal or Virginia Constitutions. The General Assembly during the
1970 Session, however, passed legislation making occupation taxes un-
lawful.22 6
Almost all of the major capital projects undertaken by local units
are financed, not by tax dollars, but rather by bond issues. However,
the power of cities, towns, and counties to incur debt is circumscribed
by the Constitution of Virginia.22T Under section 127, cities and towns
may not issue bonds which exceed 18% of the assessed valuation of
the real estate within the respective municipalities. There are certain
bonds which are specifically excluded from the general restriction of
223 Horsley, supra note 214, at 8-9; Reed, supra note 220, at 9-10. See also Snavely,
The Sales and Use Tax, 32 U. VA. NEWS LETTER, No. 4 (1955), reprinted in
READINGS IN VA. Gov'T 77.
2 2 4 Va. Acts of Assembly 1966, ch. 151; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-441.1 et seq. (1969).
See generally Morrissett, Major Tax Enactments of the 1966 Virginia Assembly, 12-T
ANr. WM. & MARY TAX CONF. PROCEEDINGS 37 (1967).
225 210 Va. 338, 171 S.E.2d 257 (1969).
226 H.B. 56, Va. Acts of Assembly 1970, ch. 748.
227 VA. CONsr. art. V7I, § 115a (1902) (counties); art. VIII, § 127 (cities and towns).
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this section. Debt incurred in anticipation of the collection of revenues
is not added to the amount of outstanding indebtedness for the pur-
poses of section 127. Likewise, bonds approved by referendum to fi-
nance a revenue-producing project are not governed by the 18% limit;
nevertheless, such debt may later be added to the outstanding debt sub-
ject to the 18% limit if the project fails to raise sufficient revenues.
Counties may issue no bonds except to meet casual deficits, to antici-
pate the collection of revenues, or to redeem a previous liability unless
the bond issue is approved by referendum.25 There have been re-
peated complaints that counties are disadvantaged by this arrangement
and that cities and counties should be treated alike insofar as public
debt is concerned. An attempt to bring cities and counties within the
same constitutional debt restrictions was made by the Virginia Com-
mission on Constitutional Revision, but it failed to win the approval
of the General Assembly in the form recommended. The 1969 Extra
Session of the Assembly did provide, however, that any county may,
after a successful referendum on the issue, elect to be treated as a city
for the purpose of issuing bonds.
In 1958, section 115a was amended to permit counties to borrow
from the Virginia Supplemental Retirement System to finance school
construction.229 No referendum is required in such instances.
PUBLIC AUTHoRITIEs IN VIRGINIA
In 1928 the General Assembly created the Norfolk-Portsmouth-Nor-
folk County Bridge Authority. 30 It lacked the autonomy of today's au-
thorities because it was headed by a commission composed of the gov-
erning bodies of the three constituent units. The veto power each unit
had led to inaction by the authority and to such friction among the
three members that positive programs became impossible.23 1
The defect in the 1928 act was eliminated in the legislation estab
lishing the Elizabeth River Tunnel Commission in 1942,232 which ac-
cording to one commentator was the first true public authority in
Virginia.28 Since that time, more than three hundred public authorities
228 VA. CONST. art. VII, § 115a (1902). See Bennett, County Debt in Virginia, 33 U.
VA. NEws LETTER, No. 16 (1957), reprinted in REDINGS iN VA. GOV'T 89.229 Va. Acts of Assembly 1958, ch. 643, at 1087.
230 Va. Acts of Assembly 1928, ch. 364.
231 MAzKiuusl & Tvwmi., supra note 82, at 31; Makielski, State Authorities: Virginia's
Govermnental Paradox, 41 U. VA. NEws LETTER 41 (1965).
2 32 Va. Acts of Assembly 1942, ch. 130.
2 3 3 MAxiu.sxt & TEMPLE, supra note 82, at 33.
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234and special districts have appeared in the state, presenting a problem
which other states had to face long before now. 23 5 It is described by
Professor Makielski:
There is the danger . .. that too many authorities too soon will
present the problems of a crazy quilt of governmental units and juris-
dictions, each with different goals, each charged with narrowly de-
fined functions, and each beyond the direct control of the electorate.236
The otherwise simple plan of local government in Virginia with its
noticeable lack of "layering" of jurisdiction except where town and
county are concerned is complicated by the presence of such a large
number of single or limited purpose authorities. 37 Yet the problems
presented by the increase in the number of these authorities and often
their very existence may not be apparent to the general public. Cer-
tainly, the nature of these hybrid governmental units is not understood
by the public, which is not surprising in light of the confusion among
experts as to what public authorities are.
Several writers have attempted definitions, but due to the great
variety of public authorities, public corporations, commissions, boards,
and special districts, it is difficult indeed to arrive at a satisfactory
definition that will fit every such creature. 23 1 A few of the definitions
offered principally for working purposes are:
A special unit of government performing some public service and
having its own fiscal authority and separate governing body.23 9
2 3 4 Src'y OF Tm COMMONWEALTH OF VA., REPORT 78-308 (1968); Makielski, The
Special District Problem in Virginia, 55 VA. L. REV. 1182, 1183 (1969).
235See, e.g., 11 N. Y. STATE CoNsr. CoNY. COMM., REPORTS 244 (1938); Davis,
Borrowing Machines, 24 NAT'L MUN. REV. 328 (1935); Nehemkis, The Public Au-
thority: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47 YAu. L.J. 14 (1927); Porter, A
Plague of Special Districts, 22 NAT'L MuN. REV. 544 (1933).236 Maldelski, State Authorities: Virginia's Governmental Paradox, 41 U. VA. NEws
LETR 41, 44 (1965).
237 MAKIrS & TEMPLE, supra note 82, at 5.
238 There is a considerable body of literature in this area. See, e.g., ACIR, THE PROB-
LEM OF SPECIAL Dismalrs IN AMERICAN GoVERNMENT (1964); J. BOLLENS, SP CAL Dismicr
GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1957); COUNCL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC Au-
THORITIES IN THE STATES (1953); W. FRnmtm-AN (ed.), THE PUBLIc CoPPoRATIoN-A COm-
PARATIVE SYMPOSIUM (1954); R. SMITH, PUBLIC AUTHORIIES, SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND LoCAL
GOVERNMENT (1964); Alderfer, Is "Authority" Financing the Answer?, 70 AM. CITY 115
(1955); Chatters, Another Point of View, 70 AM. CITY 116 (1955) (an answer to
Alderfer); Davis, Borrowing Machines, 24 NAT'L MuN. REv. 328 (1935); Ellinwood,
239 ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 227.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
A limited legislative agency or instrumentality of corporate form in-
tended to accomplish specific purposes involving long-range financing
of certain public facilities without legally or directly impinging upon
the credit of the State.240
A special public corporation whose obligations are payable solely from
its revenues or property, or both, without recourse to taxes and special
assessments. 2
41
A public corporation set up outside the regular framework of federal,
state or local government, and freed from the procedures and restric-
tions of routine government operations, in order that it may bring
The Use of Special Authorities to Finance School Improvements, 25 M-t. FIN. 48
(1953); England, Dangers of the Authority Mechanism, 51 PuB. UnILrrms FoRTNIGurLY
729 (1953); Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, The Public Authority-A Growingly Popular
Device, MoNTHLY REv., May 1955, at 3; Fox & Fox, Municipal Government and
Special--Purpose Authorities, ANNALs OF CONG. 176 (1940); Fuchs, Regional Agencies
for Metropolitan Areas, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 74 (1936); Gerwig, Public Authorities:
Legislative Panacea?, 5 J. PUB. L. 389 (1956); Gerwig, Public Authorities in the United
States, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 591 (1961); Goldberg, The Use of the "Authority" in
Public Housing, 27 GEo. L.J. 1129 (1939); Goldstein, The New York Port Authority,
5 J. PUB. L. 408 (1956); Jones, Special Districts and Authorities, in C. WOODBURY (ed.),
Tim FnumE OF Crrxs AND UmRAN REavM OPAmNT 573-86 (1953); Kurshan, How Should
Authorities Be Controlled?, 5 GovERqzmNrTAL RF.sEARcu ASs'N REP. 5 (1953); Martin,
Therefore Is the Name . . . Babel, 40 NAT'L Miri. REv. 70 (1951); McLean, Use and
Abuse of Authorities, 42 NA'L MUN. REv. 438 (1953); Morris, Evading Debt Limita-
tions with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions,
68 YAn L.J. 234 (1958); Nehemlds, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical
Aspects, 47 YALE L.J. 14 (1937); Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New
Form of Government by Proclamation, 8 VAND. L. REv. 678 (1955); Pope, New
Agencies in City Government, 36 PUB. MANAGEmEwr 122 (1954); Porter, A Plague of
Special Districts, 22 NAT'L MuN. REv. 544 (1933); Robson, The Public Corporation
in Britain Today, 63 HAav. L. REv. 1321 (1950); Savino, The Authority Concept,
5 Gov RTNrTA REsnca Ass'x REP. 80 (1953); Shestack, The Public Authority, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 553 (1957); Tilden, Problems Underlying the Control of the Public
Authority/Corporation, 1 PoR-iAL.J. 85 (1966); Tilden, Forerunners of the Public
Authority, 7 Wm. & MARY L. RFv. 1 (1966); Westmeyer, Authorities: An Escape from
Debt Limitation?, 6 GovERmENrAL REsEARcH ASS'N REP. 48 (1954); Wood, Special Au-
thorities, Mirt. FiN. 162 (1953); Note, Front Private Enterprise to Public Entity: The
Role of the Community Development Corporation, 57 GEo. L.J. 956 (1969); Note, The
Applicability of Sovereign Immunity to Independent Public Authorities, 74 HARv. L. REv.
714 (1961); Comment, Obligations of a State-Created Authority: Do They Constitute a
Debt of the State?, 53 MxcH. L. REv. 439 (1955); Alpern, Unsnarling the Traffic
Jam by the Use of Parking Authorities, 36 VA. L. REv. 1029 (1950).
2 4oGerwig, Public Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW & CoNmp. PRoB. 591
(1961).
24 1Nehemkis, supra note 235, at 14.
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the best techniques of private management to the operation of a self-
supporting or revenue-producing public enterprise.242
Professor Makielski has attempted a method for identifying public
authorities in Virginia. He has isolated five characteristics which readily
distinguish an entity as a public authority or special district: (1) They
are created by the General Assembly and are not subordinate to cities
or counties. (2) They fall within the ambit of the special fund doc-
trine, which means that their debts in no way constitute a liability of
another governmental unit and that they enjoy a considerable amount
of autonomy in their operations. (3) They are a strange blend of pub-
lic and private. They perform governmental functions and exercise
certain governmental powers such as eminent domain, but operate in
the manner of private enterprises without the usual restrictions im-
posed upon traditional units of government. (4) The functions of public
authorities are not confined to the boundaries of a single unit of local
government, but may extend into two or more jurisdictions. The ter-
ritorial range of the authority tends to coincide with the reach of its
services. (5) They are not governed by well-established legal rules
whether of statute or of case law.243
Many advantages have been cited to justify the use of these devices,
but they have generally been created out of necessity without a weigh-
ing of pros and cons.244 Those states which have constitutional limita-
tions on both state and local debt have resorted to public authorities
to provide the services which were demanded of them, but which
could not be financed by traditional units of government because of
the constitutional debt restrictions.2 45 Legislators were given very little
choice because of the reluctance of voters to amend or eliminate the
debt limitations. Special districts or public authorities supplied the
answer to their dilemma.
242 Address by Austin J. Tobin, Exec. Dir., Port of N. Y. Auth. at Rutgers U,
Mar. 26, 1953, quoted in Gerwig, supra note 239, at 594.
243 Makielski, The Special District Problem in Virginia, 55 VA. L. REV. 1182, 1184-85
(1969).
244 See Gerwig, Public Authorities: Legislative Panacea?, 5 J. PUB. L. 389 (1956).
2 45 See A. HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT 84-86 (1963);
J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 199 (1965); W. MITCHELL,
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEBT LIMITS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING 47
(1967); B. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 523 (1941); THE TAx FOUNDATION
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT CONTROL IN THE STATES 26 (1954); Morris, Evading Debt Limita-
tions with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions,
68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958); Westmeyer, Authorities: An Escape from Debt Limitation? 6
GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH AsS'N REP. 48 (1954); Note, Constitutional Restrictions on the
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The judicial acceptance of the special fund doctrine made this ap-
proach possible. 46 This doctrine permits the Commonwealth to avoid
the restrictions of sections 184, 184a, 184b, and 185; cities to avoid
the restrictions of section 127; and counties to avoid the restrictions of
section 115a. Basically, these constitutional provisions greatly limit the
borrowing of the governmental unit involved or prohibit the lending
of credit by such unit.
The special fund doctrine as applied in Virginia provides that bonds
to be serviced by income from the project for which they are issued
or from certain other earmarked funds do not constitute a debt of the
state, the city, or the county within the meaning of these constitutional
provisions.247 The doctrine owes its existence to the "revenue bond,"
which is a public finance device that shifts the risk of default from the
issuing unit to the bondholder for an added cost reflected in a higher
interest rate.2 48 The traditional general obligation bond pledges the
taxing power of the state or other unit to the repayment of the debt.
The nonguaranteed revenue bond, on the other hand, involves no such
Use of Public Authorities in the New England States, 43 Bosr. UL. REv. 122 (1963):
Comment, Obligations of a State-Created Authority: Do They Constitute a Debt of
the State?, 53 MicH. L. Rv. 439 (1955).
Of course, the cost of financing by means of the public authority device is ap-
preciably higher than the cost of financing governmental projects with general obliga-
tion bonds. U. S. DEP'T oF HEW, HEW ImicAToRs 16 (1961); A. HEINS, supra, at
36-81; J. MAXWELL, supra, at 204; W. MrrcHELr., supra, at 28; B. RATCHFORD, supra, at
514; B. ROBINSON, POSTWAR MARKEr FOR STATE AND LOCAL GovERNMENT SEcuRTIs
210-12 (1960); Darden, Virginia's Indirect Debt, 39 U. VA. NEws LETtER 21 (1963);
Kurnow, The Nonguaranteed Debt of State and Local Govermnents, 15 NAT'L TAX J.
239, 243 (1962); O'Donnell, The Tax Cost of Constitutional Debt Limitation in Indiana,
15 NAT'L TAX J. 406 (1962); Tifer, Revenue Bond Financing: Advantages and Dis-
advantages, 32 MuN. FIN. 76 (1959).
246Chesapeake Indus. Dev. Auth. v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 155 SXE.2d 326 (1967)
(dictum); Fairfax County Indus. Devel. Auth. v. Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 150 S.E.2d 87
(1966); Button v. Day, 205 Va. 739, 139 S.E.2d 838 (1965); Button v. Day, 204 Va. 270,
130 S.E.2d 459 (1963); Harrison v. Day, 202 Va. 967, 121 S.E.2d 615 (1961); Harrison v.
Day 200 Va. 764, 107 S.E.2d 594 (1959); Farquhar v. Board of Supervisors, 196 Va. 54,
82 S.E.2d 577 (1954); Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 822, 51 S.E.2d 272 (1949). But see
Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 (1968); Button v. Day, 205 Va. 629, 139.
S.E.2d 91 (1964); Town of South Hill v. Allen, 177 Va. 154, 12 S.E.2d 770 (1941);
Town of Galax v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 177 Va. 29, 12 S.E.2d 778 (1941).
For a discussion of the doctrine, see R. RATcwomw, supra note 245, at 446-66,
497-523; Gerwig, supra note 239, at 607-08; Comment, Obligations of a State-Created
Authority: Do They Constitute a Debt of the State? 53 MICH. L. REv. 439 (1955).247Farquhar v. Board of Supervisors, 196 Va. 54, 61, 82 S.E.2d 577, 582 (1954); Almond
v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 822, 842-44, 51 S.E.2d 272, 280-81 (1949).
2 4 8 See W. MItCHErL, supra note 245, at 17 et seq. See generally L KNAPPEN,
RENUE BOims oDS AM THE INVEsroa (1939).
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pledge of the issuing unit's credit. Unlike the holders of general obli-
gation or full faith and credit bonds, revenue bondholders can look
only to the revenues produced by the project financed by the bond
issue or to some other limited fund. Virginia has made considerable
use of this type of borrowing device, i.e., nonguaranteed, long-term
revenue bonds issued by authorities, commissions, and special districts,
to finance such projects as college dormitories and dining facilities,
toll bridges and highways, and other revenue-producing facilities.4 9
. The doctrine is justified upon the theory that revenue-generating
projects are self-supporting and do not rely upon appropriations from
the General Fund.25 ° Instead the debt is retired by user charges in
the form of tolls, fees, rents, or special assessments. This theory had
been extended in Virginia to uphold a plan in which funds indirectly
attributable to the construction of new facilities were pledged to re-
payment of the debt, and another plan by which the governing bodies
of certain colleges were authorized to issue bonds pledging not only the
revenues of the new project, but also any or all revenues of any exist-
ing facilities.251 Thus, the special fund doctrine has been extended to
cover bond issues involving projects which are not truly self-support-
ing to save them from constitutional attack.
There were and are other reasons for using public authorities. They
provide a more efficient method for supplying certain services. They
allow a more equitable matching of cost to benefit by means of user
charges. They are able to provide areawide services without regard
to political boundaries, which is particularly important when general
agreement among local units for the provision of such services cannot
be had. The bonds of these authorities are easier to sell than those
of cities and counties. Because of their very nature and because they
are superimposed on the existing local government pattern, they cause
a minimum of political disruption.252
Arguments against the use of public authorities except in excep-
249 See I U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BuRAu OF THE CENSUS, CENsuS OF GOVERN-
mENTs (1968); MOODY'S INvESrORS SERVICE, INC., VIUNICIPAL BONDS AND GOVERNMENT
MAN AL 2758-64 (1970).
2 50 See Button v. Day, 204 Va. 270, 273, 130 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1963); B. RATCHFORD,
supra note 245, at 497 et seq.
251 Button v. Day, 204 Va. 270, 130 S.E.2d 459 (1963), and Button v. Day, 205 Va.
739, 139 S.E.2d 838 (1965), respectively.
2 5 2 See ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 229. See also Alderfer, Is "Authority" Financing the
Answer?, 70 AM. Crry 115 (1955); Cottrell, Problems of Local Governmental Re-
organization, 2 WEST POL. Q. 599 (1949); Fuchs, Regional Agencies for Metropolitan
Areas, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 64 (1936).
210G
1970] LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 211
tional situddons have been frequently preented,25 3 -but generally ig-
nfored. The principal argument, of course, is that they are not suf-
ficiently accountable to the public. 54 The special fund doctrine requires
that the state establish these entities beyond the usual controls imposed
upon governmental units so that the individual authority can in no
way be viewed as the alter ego of the state. 2 5 The result is that voters
lack effective means to bring these authorities to account. In fact, they
cease to be taxpayers and voters where authorities are concerned; and
instead become "consumers." 256 As these authorities increase, it is all
the more important to restore some measure of popular responsibility
before they undermine the tradition of strong, democratic local gov-
ernment.
One further disadvantage of heavy reliance upon public authorities
is that they are usually created on an ad hoc basis as the need presents
itself. This tends to forestall needed, long-range planning on the
state level.257
THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM
The most acute local problems arise in metropolitan areas. Char-
acteristic of the ills that beset such areas are an evermounting financial
burden on core cities, a lack of long-range planning on an areawide
basis, political friction between core city and suburban county, and a
reluctance or an inability on the part of the various units to attack
areawide problems such as air pollution, transportation, water supply,
sewage and waste disposal, and open spaces.255
There is a traditional reliance in Virginia upon local initiative to
cope with governmental problems, but local self-help is not adequate
to the task of meeting metropolitan problems.2 5 Air pollution, for
example, does not respect political boundaries. Proper control of air
253 See e.g., ACIR, THm PROBLEM OF SPECIAL DisnucTs mN AM ucAN GovammENT
(1964); J. BOLLENS, supra note 239, at 252-56; Aronson, The Boston Redevelopment
Authority: A Quasi-Public Authority, 43 BosToN U.L. REv. 466, 488 (1963); Cameron,
Whose Authority?, ATaLrnc Momniy, Aug. 1959, at 38, 39-40.
254 See 11 N. Y. STATE CONST. CoNv. COMm., REPORTS 244 (1938).
255 Chesapeake Indus. Dev. Auth. v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 56, 155 SzE.2d 326, 331
(1967) (dictum).256 Netherton, supra note 239, at 691.
2 5 7 See J. BOLLENS, supra note 239, at 255; Makielsld, supra note 236, at 44.
58 Cf. C. ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 245-46 (2d ed. 1967); Dixon, Gov-
etnnent in Virginia's Emerging Metropolitan Areas: A Profile, 44 U. VA. NEws LnERT
25, 28 (1968). See also READINGS IN VA. GovTr 184 (1965); Shaw, The Consequences, of
Urban Growth: The Fairfax County Experience, 43 U. VA. NEws LETTER 5 (1966).
25 See HAHN REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
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pollution necessitates areawide enforcement. Likewise, the need for
better streets and highways and for public transportation is not ade-
quately met by leaving the solution to the individual governmental
units. By their very nature, such problems are broader than any single
city or county.
Virginians, unfortunately, have been slow to appreciate the prob-
lems which accompany the emergence of large metropolitan communi-
ties.2' 6 There is a tendency to think as before. As a consequence, the
traditional local governmental units are left to deal with these problems.
When these problems become insoluble on the local level, state assistance is
reluctantly called for.28 ' Occasionally, even federal action is requested.
But local leaders are notably indifferent or hostile to the formation of
a metropolitan government. 2
There are undoubtedly many reasons for the lag between the reality
of metropolitan life and the myth that Virginia's existing structure
and traditional approach will accommodate the new problems. These
problems sprang up so suddenly that Virginians were not prepared for
them. For years Virginians had witnessed metropolitan growing pains
in other states while they themselves were left relatively unaffected.
City-county separation has contributed to a degree of autonomy and
local independence perhaps not to be found in other states. Yet this
same independence makes cooperation among the units within Virginia's
metropolitan areas even more difficult. Local units are reluctant to
surrender any prerogative or power. Appeals to this traditionally strong
local spirit perpetuate resistance to change and merely postpone the
inevitable confrontation with the overwhelming problems of metro-
politan areas.203
2 6 0 Makielski, Local Leadership and the Virginia Metropolitan Area, 44 U. VA.
NEws LETTER 33 (1968).
2 6 1See ACIR, METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FEDERUALISM 8-9 (1966); L.
GULICK, THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM AND AMERICAN IDEAS 135 (1962); R. MARTIN,
TiE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 162-69 (1965).
Because metropolitan areas often stretch across state lines and because states have
been notoriously inept in dealing with metropolitan problems, programs have been
initiated which bypass the state altogether. See id. at 42, 111-32. See generally R.
CONNERY & R. LEACH, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND METROPOLITAN AREAS (1960).
262 Makielski, supra note 260, at 36.
263 Cf. HAHN REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-11. Makielsld has surveyed local, civic and
governmental leaders and found that they recognize the interdependence of local
units and the need for greater state effort and intergovernmental cooperation, but
maintain, nevertheless, a "firm faith in the overall adequacy of the present forms and
methods of government and the tradition of strong local government in meeting major
problems of governing the States." Makielski, supra note 260, at 36.
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The racial composition of Virginia's metropolitan areas has caused
predominantly white suburban counties to resist annexation, consoli-
dation, or the creation of any areawide governmental or quasi-govern-
*mental entity with sufficient power and responsibility to deal with
the larger problems. Suburbanites want no part of the unruly central
city with its higher taxes, crime, and bureaucracy.2 4 Not surprisingly,
the predominantly Negro core cities are often just as reluctant to
move toward areawide government for fear that their political power
will be diluted. 265
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has ob-
served that the "metropolitan area problem is primarily a public fi-
nance problem." 266 But it is not the sort of financial problem that
can be solved by better financial administration alone. The principal
cause of the problem is the "spillover" phenomenon discussed earlier
in this article. 67 In the modem metropolitan setting, services provided
by one component local unit very often extend beyond its boundaries.
This disturbs the equitable balance between the enjoyment of services
and the cost of providing them. Quite clearly, the core city suffers
most acutely from these "spillovers." 21
There is also a great discrepancy between "core cities and their sub-
urbs in the fiscal capacity to raise adequate revenue on one hand and
the needs for public services on the other." 269 What to do about this
problem has caused a political divergence so fundamental and so
marked that progress in other areas of metropolitan affairs has often
been frustrated. Race and class distinctions become central issues and
charge the atmosphere with the deepest tensions.
The issue goes beyond whether suburban residents will bear a pro-
portionate share of the cost of services which the city provides for
their enjoyment. The question is whether the suburbs, which have the
fiscal capacity, will subsidize services provided by the city for the poor
and disadvantaged who concentrate there. These services are not re-
stricted to public welfare, health and hospital services, which often are
2 04 D. LoCKARD, TnE Pouncs OF STATE Am LOCAL GOVERNMENT 496 (2d ed. 1969).
265 ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 256-57; L. GuLiCK, supra note 261, at 98-99.
2 00 ACIR GovERN VmNTAL STRUCrURE, ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN
AREAS 15 (1961). See also Bane, Local Governzment: The Next Half Century, 42 U. VA.
NEws LETTER 25, 26 (1966); Berk, The Metropolitan Financing Crisis, 38 VA. MuN.
REv. 9 (1961).
267 See text p. 181, supra.
2 6 8 See ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 236-38.
2609 Woo Sik Kee, City-Suburban Differentials in Local Government Fiscal Effort,
21 NAT'L TAx J. 183 (1968).
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subsidized by the state and the federal government. They include
other services which are not in the nature of welfare-recreational facili-
ties, public transportation, and urban renewal. 70 It is difficult to "sell"
projects of this kind to voters in suburban counties who, more than
likely, will derive only indirect benefits, if any, from them.
At the heart of the metropolitan problem is the lack of areawide
democratic machinery to deal with problems that are larger than the
individual local units.27 1 Only when the artificiality of present political
boundaries is recognized will it be possible to mold a metropolitan
constituency and to create the governmental devices needed to solve
metropolitan problems. The metropolitan area is an organic whole and
problems which are truly metropolitan in character should no longer
be attacked in a piecemeal fashion by city, county or even public
authority.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM
A catalogue of alternative solutions to the metropolitan dilemma
has come from many sources, including commissions especially cre-
270 See Hirsch, Local versus Areawide Urban Government Services, 17 NAT'L TAX J.
331, 338 (1964). Hirsch concludes that those services which have income redistribution
characteristics, such as welfare, housing, education and health, should be subsidized by
federal and state governments. He carefully examines the range of services generally
provided on the local level and suggests which would best be provided on an areawide
basis. Id. at 333-37.
An excellent description of the financial burden carried by core cities can be found
in ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 237:
The core city furnishes free services to suburbanites by providing them with
roads and traffic control devices during their journey to work. It usually permits
suburbanites to use libraries, parks, and recreational facilities free, although
quite a few suburbs restrict their own facilities to residents. The city must ex-
pand its public-health department in order to inspect the restaurants where
the noontime hordes of suburbanites eat-blissfully unaware that it costs other
people money to see to it that they are not poisoned. Public-welfare costs hit
the core city especially hard, although the cost of unemployment is a social one
logically distributable among all members of society and not among core-city
residents alone.
The large cities also pay most of the state taxes since, in spite of losses to the
suburbs, they remain centers of concentration of wealth. Yet the state tends to
spend most of its money in the rural and suburban areas expecting the large
cities to finance most of their functions themselves. The state police, for
example, will often lend assistance to the amateurish efforts of suburban police-
men but seldom operate within the core city. Health, education, highway, wel-
fare, and other state functions may be provided more generously outside the
large cities than inside them. Grants-in-aid by the state usually give preference
to the lesser populated local governments.
271 See L. GvLIcn, supra note 261, at 123-24.
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ated for that purpose, such as the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations272 and the Virginia Metropolitan Areas Study
Commission.2 73 These are the major proposals suggested: (1) annexa-
tion, (2) merger or consolidation of city and suburban county, (3)
public authorities to perform areawide functions, (4) integrated metro-
politan government as in Toronto, (5) metropolitan federation with
traditional local units retaining those functions that are not truly area-
wide, (6) cooperative arrangements between and among local units
in the metropolitan area to deal with individual problems, (7) extra-
territorial powers for cities so that they may cope with areawide prob-
lems, (8) additional powers to the county so that it might serve as the
overall metropolitan unit, (9) the separation of city and county, and
(10) increased state and federal involvement.2 7 4
Annexation has rather effectively permitted an accommodation of
urban growth in Virginia until recent years.275 Texas and Missouri are
perhaps the only other states which allow annexation without a refer-
endum in the area to be annexed.276 This factor has contributed to
relatively comfortable expansion of city boundaries as the need arose.
Certainly the use of a judicial proceeding in annexation matters rather
than reliance upon the legislative or administrative process has served
to remove the issue of boundary expansion even further from politics.2 77
Before the automobile, FHA and VA financing, and the decentrali-
zation of industry made "urban sprawl" possible, annexation was ade-
quate .2 7 Now, however, the needs of outlying communities for urban
services often arise long before the city is prepared or legally per-
mitted to annex such areas. One of the key phrases in annexation law
is "reasonably compact body of land." 279 It is not unusual, however,
for suburban communities to emerge some distance from city boundaries.
2 72ACIR, ALTERNATIvE APPROACHES TO GOvERNmENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METRO-
PoLITAN AREAS (1962).2 7 3 HAHN REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-19.
274See generally ADRiAN, supra note 41, at 246-54; D. LocKAPR, supra note 264,
at 487-501; Fordham, Local Government in the Larger Scheme of Things, 8. VAMD. L.
REv. 667, 672-73 (1955); Grant, Trends in Urban Government and Administration, 30
LAW & CoNrEMP. PROB. 38, 46 (1965).
275See VALC, ANNExATION AND CONSOLIDATION 11 (1964); Deming, An Approach to
the Solution of Metropolitan Government Problems, 35 VA. MuN. REv. 292, 293 (1958);
Griffin, Units of Local Government in Virginia, 1962, 40 U. VA. NEws LETTER 1, 4
(1963).
270 See ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 247.
277 See generally C. BAIN, ANNExATION IN VmGINA (1966).
278 See ADRAN, supra note 41, at 235-36.
279 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1042 (a) (1964); see C. BAIN, supra note 277, at 140-45.
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Annexation, in such cases, is out of the question. The General Assembly,
as has been seen, has granted counties additional powers to provide urban
services to these areas. Thus, by the time these areas actually converge
with the city, thereby making the area adjacent to the city limits
sufficiently urban in character to be annexed, it is probably being sup-
plied many urban services by some other unit, usually the county
through a sanitary district.
In metropolitan areas, cities no longer grow in concentric rings.
Technology has made it possible for urban services to be offered to
areas well beyond the city.280 This fact has forced a reconsideration
of the maxim that urban populations were to be governed by cities
and rural populations by counties. Annexation will continue to be re-
lied upon, particularly by cities outside of metropolitan areas; but
Virginia's larger cities must look for something in addition to or in-
stead of annexation to provide a satisfactory solution to their current
ills.2 1 It is too slow and costly, allows for only piecemeal growth, and
hampers long-range metropolitan planning.282
The threat of annexation also frustrates city-county cooperative ef-
forts and contracts between city and county for the provision of cer-
tain municipal services to the county by the city. Suburban counties
fear that such arrangements will be relied upon by the city in later an-
nexation proceedings to show the dependency of the county upon the
city.28 Ironically, the threat of annexation has stimulated interest in,
and in some instances actually produced, city-county consolidation.2
Most commentators consider consolidation a much more satisfactory
method of solving boundary expansion problems than annexation.8 5 In
the first place, it eliminates the resentment of suburbanites which often
continues to cause friction long after annexation has been accomplished.
When city and county merge, they do so as equals and then only after
a referendum.288 Consolidation also produces a new unit that is more
metropolitan in character than any product of annexation proceedings
280 See ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 204.
281 HAHN REPORT, supra note 1, at 18-19.
2 8 2 See VA. METROPOLITAN ArEAs STuDY COMM'N, GOVERNING THE VIRGINIA METRO-
POLITAN AREAs: AN AssEssMENr 29-30 (1967); Dixon, supra note 258, at 28; Makielski,
supra note 260, at 35.
2 8 3 HAHN REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
284 See Temple, Merger in Virginia Local Govermnent: Issues and Implications, 40
U. VA. NEws LETTER 5, 7 (1963).
285 See, e.g., ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 249.
286 See Temple, supra note 284, at 7.
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could be. It is thus in a better position to dispense areawide services
and to meet areawide problems.
Virginia has been a leader in consolidation of local governmental
units.287 The first took place in the state between the cities of Rich-
mond and Manchester under a 1910 special act.288 Since 1952, con-
solidations in Tidewater Virginia have made it "the scene of the most
extensive local governmental reform in the nation." 289 Merger is cur-
rently a live topic in Richmond and Norfolk but was recently defeated
in Charlottesville. A most ambitious plan is under consideration in the
Norfolk area where the cities of Norfolk, Portsmouth, Chesapeake and
Virginia Beach are exploring the consolidation of all four units.
Although merger avoids the piecemeal disintegration of urban coun-
ties,2 0 it may not produce a governmental unit that truly reflects the
outlines of the sociological complex that is the metropolis. In addition
to this shortcoming, consolidation may fail to provide an answer be-
cause, in the words of the Hahn Commission, "the political feasibility
of consolidation is generally limited." 291
Another suggested approach is functional consolidation, wherein
the local units involved retain their identities, but where certain func-
tions are performed jointly.9 2 The popular sentiment against such an
approach was demonstrated by the defeat of a proposed constitutional
amendment in 1960 which would have facilitated functional consoli-
dation.0 3
Among the remaining alternatives, several can readily be discarded.
Virginia already has city-county separation, but metropolitan woes
persist. Making the county the metropolitan unit of government (a
proposal which is almost the converse of city-county separation) is
unsatisfactory for at least two reasons: (1) there is usually more than
one county in Virginia's metropolitan areas,2 4 and (2) the county is
quite often a poor profile of the metropolitan area.295 Giving cities extra-
territorial powers to solve specific metropolitan problems is at best
2 87 See VA. MFTROPoLrrA AREAS Sxumm COMM'N, supra note 282, at 31.
2 88 Va. Acts of Assembly 1910, ch. 127, at 193-99.
2So Makielski, City-County Consolidation in the United States, 46 U. VA. NEws
LE-rER 1, 3 n.1 (Oct. 15, 1969).
29 0 See Temple, supra note 284, at 9.
201 HAHN REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
2o2 See Uhl, Functional Consolidation in the Counties of Virginia, 25 NAT'L MuN.
REv. 601 (1936).
293 Va. Acts of Assembly 1960, ch. 613, at 1071-74.
294 HAHN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 17.
295 AMRIAN, supra note 41, at 252.
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a temporary solution.296 Cooperation among local units should be en-
couraged, of course, but reliance upon informal agreements and ser-
vice contracts will not satisfy the compelling need to adopt long-
range areawide plans, and such reliance also overlooks the desirability
of establishing a responsive, democratic government for the entire
metropolitan area.
Much can be said in favor of public authorities and special districts
as vehicles for metropolitan problem-solving. 297 The scope of their
activities can be limited to those functions which are areawide, leaving
"local" functions to the existing governmental units. The territorial
reach of the authority or district can be drawn to fit the metropolitan
area without regard to existing political boundaries. There would be
a minimum of political disruption since the present local structure
would nominally remain intact. The weaknesses of this approach,
however, are serious. 298 Traditionally, authorities and special districts
have been used in conjunction with revenue-producing projects which
are operated as businesses rather than as governmental undertakings.
Because they are not directly accountable to the public, they tend to
be undemocratic. Without the usual governmental characteristics and
without a governing body elected directly by the voters, they are
politically unsuitable for such a role.299
A metropolitan government with broad powers is simply out of the
question in Virginia, at least for the present. There is a very strong
political sentiment that individuals should have access to local units
of government to insure grassroots control. Many Virginians appar-
ently fear that bigger governmental units will mean less popular con-
trol, more bureaucracy and greater impersonality.
A "two-tiered", government has been proposed for metropolitan
areas.300 In fact, it has been used with relative success in London. Un-
der this arrangement, all areawide functions would be the responsibility
of a governmental unit with territorial jurisdiction approximating the
metropolitan area. Functions which can best be handled by local units,
either for reasons of economy or because of an overriding need to pro-
vide for citizen participation and control, would continue to be the
296 Id. at 253.
297 See Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by
Proclamation, 8 VAND L. REv. 678 (1955).
298See id. at 690-92. See also ADRIAN, supra note 41, at 248-49; D. LoCKARD,
supra note 274, at 489 et seq.
299 See D. LocKARD, supra note 264, at 490.
300 ACIR, supra note 272.
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responsibility of such local units. The governing body of the metro-
politan unit would be popularly elected by the voters of the entire area.
The recommendations of the Hahn Commission resemble this "two-
tiered" alternative, but they would not entail an immediate, radical
departure from the present local government system. The Hahn Com-
mission envisaged a gradual vesting of functions in a "service district."
The local units would be encouraged to do so through financial in-
centives. When the desirability of some sort of areawide agency be-
comes apparent to Virginians as a result of their experience with these
service districts, the prospect of a metropolitan government will no
longer arouse such strong political reaction.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
During the last several years much has occurred to affect the future
of local government in Virginia. In 1967, the Metropolitan Areas Study
Commission recommended a bold approach to metropolitan problem-
solving.3"1 The General Assembly at its 1968 Session adopted legislation
to carry out those proposals. 02 At the same session a revision of the
Constitution of Virginia was authorized.303
The Commission on Constitutional Revision consolidated the two
articles in the 1902 Constitution which dealt with municipal govern-
ments and counties separately. This was characteristic of the general
attitude of the Commission that the Constitution should treat counties
and cities more alike. 0 4 The more important changes suggested by the
Commission in regard to local government were: (1) allowing coun-
ties with 25,000 or more inhabitants to adopt charters; (2) allowing
a measure of "home rule" to cities and charter counties including the
power to amend their charters without the need for special legislation
by the General Assembly; (3) an increase in the population minimum
from 5,000 to 25,000 for transition from town to city; (4) provision
for regional governments; and (5) the creation of a Commission on
Local Government.30 5
The 1969 Extra Session of the General Assembly failed to adopt
several of the Commission's proposals.30 6 In particular, the legislature
chose to continue and, in fact, to broaden the practice of dealing with
301 See HAHN REPORT, supra note 1.
302 Va. Acts of Assembly 1968, ch. 224, at 322.
80 3 Va. Acts of Assembly 1968, at 1568.
304 CCR REPoRTr 19.
sOrId. at 19-20, 213-53.
306 Acts Ex. 1969, art. VII.
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the individualized problems of localities by means of special acts. The
number of inhabitants needed for transition from town to city was
left at 5,000, but the General Assembly will be permitted to increase
such limits by general law. The charter county provision was com-
pletely eliminated. The 1970 Session approved the package of consti-
tutional amendments passed by the General Assembly in 1969, and
these proposals will be put to the voters in the fall of 1970.307
Another study commission, the Rural Affairs Study Commission,
noting that as the metropolitan areas are becoming more densely popu-
lated, the rural areas are losing population, recommended that the state
attempt to reverse the trend.
The proposition that underlies this entire report is that the govern-
ment of the Commonwealth of Virginia has the means for affecting
the distribution of population and economic activity for the better.
It can prevent excessive concentration in the metropolitan areas and
increase the relative population and economic shares of the non-metro-
politan areas.308
Among its specific proposals was a recommendation that Virginia
abandon city-county separation,30 9 a suggestion which the Hahn Com-
mission had rejected. The Rural Affairs Commission, however, did
strongly endorse the planning and service district programs enacted
as a result of the Hahn Report. °
CONCLUSION
Reform of Virginia's system of local government will come. The
magnitude of the problems will not permit otherwise. Former Gover-
nor Godwin remarked that Virginians can do it themselves, or it will
be done for them.3 ' The federal government has already begun to
move in that direction.
As Virginia's experience with public authorities indicates, the state
has been all too willing to deal with local and regional problems on
an ad hoc basis. Coordinated planning has been sacrificed as a result.
The problems of each metropolitan area unmistakably affect the state
307 Va. Acts of Assembly 1970, ch. 763.
30 8 VA. RuRAL AFFAIRS STUDY COMM'N, REPORT 2 (1969).
309 Id. at 26.
310 Id. at 30.
811 Godwin, Virginia and Her Localities: A Necessary Partnership, 43 U. VA. NEws
LmrmR 5, 8 (1966).
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as a whole and must be resolved with that in mind. Nevertheless, each
locality has peculiar needs that will not be met through general legis-
lation. There appear to be only two ways to provide remedies tailored
to the needs of individual localities and metropolitan areas: special
legislation or some measure of home rule. Virginians may be familiar
with the shortcomings of the former, but are unprepared for the latter.
The recommendations of the Virginia Metropolitan Areas Study
Commission may not supply all the answers, but for Virginia's purposes
no other proposal seems as sound. In fact, the principal criticism of
these recommendations came not from those who proposed another
approach to solve metropolitan problems, but rather from those who
preferred the status quo. The traditional approach, which leaves the
solution of problems to existing local units with some state financial
assistance, will fail if the experience of other states is an accurate
indicator. Should Virginia cling to this traditional approach and the
national pattern of failure hold, metropolitan problems will be even
more costly and difficult to resolve.
The enactment of legislation adopting the Hahn Commission's pro-
posals does not mean that Virginia has already abandoned the tradi-
tional approach. Only when those statutes are put into practice will the
state be committed to a new course. The "carrot and stick" approach
may insure a limited degree of success for the Hahn Plan, but financial
incentives alone cannot solve regional and metropolitan problems. An
entirely new political climate must appear before the full force of the
Hahn Plan will be felt. The Commission obviously believed that finan-
cial incentives would effect such a change, and they will help, no doubt.
But the resistance of many Virginians to any areawide unit of govern-
ment runs deeper than economics. Unless local leadership actively
seeks to change these attitudes, it will be some time before the Hahn
Plan achieves the degree of success of which it seems capable.
A cautious approach to change has been taken so far by the Gen-
eral Assembly; but far more has been done, perhaps, than was ever
thought possible by many observers of Virginia politics. The 1968 As-
sembly did enact legislation to implement the Hahn Commission's
recommendations and authorized Governor Godwin to appoint a com-
mission to revise the Constitution. Although many of the major pro-
posals of the Commission on Constitutional Revision concerning local
government did not survive the 1969 Extra Session, some changes in
the general direction suggested by that Commission were adopted.
One conclusion is inescapable. Changes in this century have led to
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an interdependence among governmental units that cannot be ignored
without serious consequences. The traditional approach to the provi-
sion of services and the solution of problems below the state level is
inadequate. Some new direction will have to be taken if the people of
Virginia are to have the services they demand and if the answers to
the growing metropolitan problems are to be found.
But, as the Hahn Commission recognized, there will be neither an
abrupt overhaul of the traditional system nor an immediate elimination
of the existing local units. Political reality dictates gradual change.
The functional approach recommended by the Hahn Commission
contemplates an increasing delegation of areawide functions as they
arise to a unit of government large enough to handle them. The tradi-
tional local units will continue to exist and to perform local functions,
but their importance will ebb as each new function is added to the supra-
local unit.
There is nothing final or sacrosanct about any governmental unit or
system. They are means to an end. When they cease to provide the
services expected of them, they must be changed. What the product
of such change will be depends upon the balance Virginians strike be-
tween the need for efficiency and a desire for grassroots control.
